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Abstract
My dissertation consists of three papers on capital structure decisions in
production networks and the relation between debt type and acquisitions
activity.
The first paper explores the role of leverage in the interaction between
non-financial industries. The current state of technology dictates the
structure of customer-supplier links in the production network. I look at
how industries make decisions about their capital structure, the size of the
leverage, given this network connections. A theoretical setup illustrates
the joint optimal capital structure choices of different industries depend-
ing on the intensity of input-output links and industries’ characteristics.
Based on these results, the empirical part of the paper demonstrates that,
first, the more suppliers or customers an industry has, the higher its lever-
age becomes and, second, that industries with highly levered partners
have a higher leverage themselves.
The second paper studies the relations between the leverage ratios of non-
financial companies and their connections both along the supply chain and
in product market competition. I show that the positioning of the firm
in the trading network is important and that every new supply contract
will on average lead to a drop of 0.1% in market leverage. The general
insight of this empirical paper is that companies with numerous trading
links tend to have higher leverage ratios.
In the third paper together with my co-authors, Theodosios Dimopoulos
and Stefano Sacchetto, I explore the relation between capital structure
policies and mergers and acquisitions activity. We find that the prob-
ability of becoming an acquirer is positively associated with the firms
pre-acquisition deviation from target debt maturity. Moreover, we ex-
amine the implications of debt maturity for bidder and target returns,
and for target selection and find that the average target size co-vary with
long-term debt deficit.
Re´sume´
Ma the`se est constitue´e de trois articles sur les de´cisions relatives a` la
structure du capital dans les re´seaux de production et sur la relation
entre le type de dettes et l’activite´ d’acquisition.
Le premier article explore le roˆle du levier financier dans les interactions
entre industries non-financie`res. La partie the´orique illustre comment les
choix communs des industries envers une structure optimale du capital
sont guide´s par l’intensite´ des liens d’entre´e-sortie et les caracte´ristiques
des industries. La partie empirique, base´e sur ces re´sultats, de´montre
que plus une industrie a de fournisseurs ou clients, plus son levier devient
important et que par ailleurs les industries ayant des partenaires avec des
leviers importants ont elles-meˆmes de plus grands leviers.
Le deuxie`me article e´tudie la connexion entre les ratios de levier des en-
treprises non-financie`res ainsi que leurs liens pendant la chaˆıne logistique
et leur relation de concurrence sur le marche´ des produits. Je de´montre
que le positionnement d’une entreprise dans un re´seau commercial est im-
portant et que chaque nouveau contrat avec un fournisseur va diminuer
en moyenne de 0,1% son levier financier. Cet article empirique mon-
tre que d’un point de vue ge´ne´ral les entreprises avec de nombreux liens
commerciaux ont tendance a` avoir plus de levier.
Dans le troisie`me article nous explorons, mes co-auteurs Theodosios Di-
mopoulos et Stefano Sacchetto, et moi-meˆme, la relation entre les poli-
tiques de structure du capital et l’activite´ de fusion et d’acquisition. Nous
avons trouve´ que la probabilite´ de devenir acque´reur d’une entreprise est
associe´e positivement avec les de´viations de la maturite´ de la dette pre´dite
avant l’acquisition. De plus un examen de maturite´ de la dette sur les
rendements des entreprises acque´reur et cible ainsi que de la se´lection
de cette cible montre que la taille moyenne de l’entreprise cible e´volue
conjointement a` la maturite´ de la dette.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Capital structure describes the composition of a company’s assets. The proportion in which
the firm mixes common shares, preferred stocks, and bonds affects its cost of capital and its
risk profile. The companies try to keep both these parameters low. In order to understand
what is an ideal mix of their securities, companies look for their optimal capital structure.
The extensive literature offers theoretical models and empirical evidence on how the optimal
capital structure should be composed. However, several capital structure puzzles remain
some of the major unresolved puzzles of corporate finance. The insight provided by the
dominant trade-off theory does not fit the empirical evidence about capital structure. For
example, contrary to the theory predictions, leverage ratios are found to be too low and
debt-to-equity ratios of similar firms remain quite different.
My dissertation focuses on the capital structure and debt composition as an essential
determinant of the interaction between economic agents.
In Chapter 2 “Capital Structure Decisions in Industry Networks” I explore the strategic
role of leverage in the interaction between non-financial industries. I employ a network
model of corporate capital structure decisions in which every industry (representing a node
in the network) makes their capital structure decisions dependent on their trading links
(representing the edges of the network) with other industries. I first develop a simple the-
oretical setup that illustrates the joint behavior of optimal capital structure depending on
the intensity in input-output links and given firms’ characteristics. Based on these results,
I show in the empirical part of the paper that the position of an industry in the network
affects its capital structure policy. The more suppliers or customers an industry has or
the more connected to other industries they are, the higher its leverage becomes. My sec-
ond empirical finding is a positive dependence between partner industries’ leverages. Using
a spatial-autoregressive model I show that industries with highly levered partners have a
higher leverage themselves. This network effect supports the hypothesis that leverage is
used as an instrument to improve a firm’s bargaining position.
Chapter 3 “Leverage as a Commitment Tool in Product Market Networks” studies the
connection between the leverage ratios of non-financial companies and their connections
both along supply chain and in product market competition. I show that the positioning
of the firm in the trading network is important and that every new supply contract will on
average lead to a drop of 0.1% in market leverage. The effect does not disappear if I control
for the proximity to the final consumer. I use novel data describing the product market
network on several levels: supply chain flows and competition relation. I confirm that core
firms, in terms of supply chain, demonstrate better economic performance. Peripheral firms,
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with regard to competition, tend to have higher leverage. The general insight of this empiri-
cal paper is that companies with numerous trading links tend to have higher leverage ratios.
In Chapter 4 “Debt Type and Acquisitions” my co-authors, Theodosios Dimopoulos
and Stefano Sacchetto, and I explore the relation between capital structure policies and
mergers and acquisitions activity. We study empirically how deviations from target debt
maturity affect acquisition decisions. We find that the probability of becoming an acquirer
is positively associated with the firm’s pre-acquisition deviation from target debt maturity.
Moreover, we examine the implications of debt maturity for bidder and target returns, and
for target selection. We find that the average target size co-vary with long-term debt deficit.
We also investigate the potential of several economic theories to explain the link between
debt maturity and acquisition policy.
Chapter 5 concludes and suggests the insights for future research.
4
Chapter 2
Capital Structure Decisions in the
Supplier-Customer Network
We explore network effects in capital structure decision making. The economy is presented
as a set of nodes (industries) and edges (trading links between them). First, we propose a
simple theoretical setup which allows us to illustrate numerically joint dynamics of optimal
capital structure choices with respect to agents’ characteristics and the intensity of input-
output links.We find that the position of an industry in the network affects its capital
structure policy. The more suppliers or customers an industry has or the more connected
to other industries it is, the higher its leverage becomes. Our second finding is a positive
dependence between partner industries’ leverages. It implies that industries with highly
levered partners are prone to keep higher leverage. This result supports the theory that
leverage is partly used as an instrument to improve an economic agent’s bargaining position.
The results are confirmed under multiple robustness checks.
2.1 Introduction
Economic agents do not make capital structure decisions in a vacuum. The default of one
firm affects the credit risk of its partners and may cause contagion. Empirical studies show
that both intra-industry (Leary and Roberts, 2014) and inter-industry (Kale and Shahrur,
2007) links affect an individual firm’s capital structure policy. The nature of connections
between companies varies with the roles which each one of them plays in the relationship.
The firm could be a competitor, a supplier, and a customer simultaneously, but it chooses
the role-specific behaviour as a response to its partners’ observed characteristics. This
multifunctionality allows us to consider the firm not only in the dimensions of competitive
interaction or of upstream-downstream connections, but as an element of a network. The
purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the role of cross-industry connections for
capital structure choice, to explore through which channels this effect manifest itself, and to
understand how economic agents depend on their surroundings. The novelty of the research
question is in the focus on network effects rather than on pairwise connections.
In this paper an economy is presented as a network, in which each node is an industry.
Every node has individual characteristics — average size, profitability, tangibility, market-
to-book ratio, R&D expenditures — as well as capital structure decision characteristics —
mean leverage ratio. The agents, i.e. industries, are expected to choose their actions, i.e.
the level of debt load, not only based on their specific properties, but also as a response
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to adjacent nodes’ actions. We use inter-industry input-output flows as a proxy for the
customer-supplier connections between agents.
The flows are given by an input-out matrix. All firms in the economy are assigned to
107 sectors which provide a fraction of their yearly output as an input for other sectors’
production process.
The effects we find are twofold. First, the position of an agent in the network affects
the level of its leverage. Agents with more suppliers or more customers, who are important
nodes in multi-link supplier-customer chains and are more exposed to economic interaction,
tend to have higher leverage. Second, our estimations show that the industries tend to
increase their leverage in response to a raise in their partners’ leverage.
Our work mainly belongs to research areas of upstream-downstream relationships and
peer network effects. The former can be discussed from a trade-off point of view. Hennessy
and Livdan (2009) point out that the size of leverage is a trade-off between strengthening of
a bargaining position and default costs. They found direct costs of default to be relatively
low, while mainly indirect ones outbalance the leverage, such as costs of losing suppliers,
customers, receivables. Thus, firms tend to decrease their leverage to strengthen their con-
nections with partners. On the other hand, firms have an incentive to increase the leverage.
A high leverage ratio deliberately raises the required minimum threshold in a bargaining
game in a supplier-customer partnership. Hennessy and Livdan (2009) derive a theoret-
ical model for optimal capital structure in the supplier-customer relationship framework,
and show that leverage increases along with the bargaining power of supplier. Kale and
Shahrur (2007) use an alternative approach of agency costs. According to this approach,
the firm uses lower leverage to encourage their partners to undertake relationship-specific
investments.
The second field of literature follows studies in social sciences and provides an effective
methodology to control for spill-over effects throughout the network. To the best of our
knowledge, Leary and Roberts (2014) were the first to use the peer network approach in
corporate finance. They reveal the presence of within-industry peer effects in capital struc-
ture decision making. Moreover, they describe two sources from which a firm can receive
a signal about an environmental shock: competitors’ policies, i.e. capital structure deci-
sions, and competitors’ characteristics, i.e. profitability, sales, etc. Firms react mostly to
their policies, not to other firms’ characteristics. The manner in which firms absorb shocks
depends also on the type of the firm. In Leary and Roberts (2014) model each agent can
belong to one of the two groups: leaders or followers. The latter mimics the former, but not
vice versa. Leary and Roberts (2014) use a linear-in-means empirical model. According to
(Bramoulle´, Djebbari, and Fortin, 2009), this class of models faces two challenges. Firstly,
socially exogenous (individual characteristics), endogenous (peers’ outcomes) effects, and
correlated effects (common environment) should be identified and distinguished. The dif-
ficulty is to disentangle their effect. The second challenge is collinearity between average
peers’ outcome and average peers’ characteristics. Leary and Roberts (2014) resolve both
by estimating the spill-over effect by the instrumental variable approach. Alternatively,
(Bramoulle´, Djebbari, and Fortin, 2009) derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the
identification of the model. It is worth noting that the peer network approach is not common
in theoretical models.
Possible theoretical explanations of how intra-industry connections influence firms’ de-
cisions can be found in different fields.1 Product market competition aspect was raised by
1We do not discuss a vast literature on industry effects on capital structure and how within-industry
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Brander and Lewis (1986), they claim that the debt mimicking stems from competition re-
action functions. Myers and Majluf (1984) developed an information asymmetry approach:
managers signal to outside investors about the firm quality through the type of external
financing. The most modern field is rational herding models. According to Devenow and
Welch (1996) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1998), firms use informational cas-
cades: they rely on the decision of the firm with greater expertise department. Scharfstein
and Stein (1990) propose another behavioural argument: sometimes similarity of decisions
could be more rational than efficient.
Among many various techniques, we choose a production network setup, similar to Chu
(2012) and Acemoglu et al. (2012) to construct our toy model. To introduce uncertainty,
I follow Acemoglu et al. (2012) and model it though individual production to every indus-
try. Chu (2012) demonstrates an alternative approach, where the uncertainty is driven by
product prices. While at the first glance it seems quite rational, it has its hidden traps.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows: Section 2.2 introduces a theoretical setup
and illustrates numerically how characteristics of nodes neighbours and the node’s con-
nectedness in the network affect its capital structure. Section 2.3 describes the data used,
Section 2.4 discusses regression specifications and presents results. Section 2.5 concludes,
and Appendices contain details on the data, techniques and regressions.
2.2 Model
This section describes a theoretical model and its predictions. First, we introduce a setup
of the economy. Then we discuss default boundaries. At the end of the section, we show
how the solution of the model changes depending on its parameters.
2.2.1 Network Economy Setup
The economy consists of n industries. Every industry produces a unique product and uses
other industries’ goods in its production process. Industries trade with each other at a fixed
price. If an agent ceases its economic activity — because of a default, for example, — its
customers cannot switch to a different supplier. Thus, we identify the agents as industries.2
An adjacency matrix W = {wij}, wij ≥ 0, describes the supplier-customer relations in
the economy and designates the share of good j in the total intermediate input use of firms
in sector i. In particular, wij = 0 if sector i does not use good j as input for production.
The matrix might be asymmetric: if an industry i is a client of an industry j, wij > 0, it
does not imply that the industry i supplies the industry j at the same time, i.e. wji can
be 0. For example, farmers supply the ketchup production with tomatoes, but they do not
buy the ketchup to grow vegetables. The use of industry’s own product as an input, wii, is
defined according to the production function.3 However, there exists a restriction that the
competition affects capital structure here, since our focus is inter-industries variation of leverage and we
assume that firms’ debt loads tend to be similar within the same industry.
2If we consider the case of nodes representing individual companies, we will have to model an option to
switch between suppliers. When a company defaults, its customers are hit by a temporary supply shock
before they find a replacement, as they bear search and switching costs. However this shock is not as severe
as a permanent loss of supplier.
3According to BEA input-output matrix, in 2002 an average consumption by an industry of its own
product is 13%. Fish and other nonfarm animals and Transit and ground passenger transportation are
examples of sectors which do not consume its own product at all. Aerospace products and parts, in contrast,
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agents, j = 1, . . . , n, consume all the product that is produced in this period by the given
industry i. Th market clearing condition is defined by an equation
n∑
j=1
wij = 1.
The column vector X = {xi}, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, contains the magnitude of individual
inputs, where xi denotes how much industry i produces.
Every industry receives a production shock Ai . The shocks Ai, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, are
independent and uniformly disturbed with the base [Aˇi, Aˆi]. The shocks distribution is
common knowledge in the economy.
These components combine into a linear production function4
Fi(Wi, X) = Ai
n∑
j=1
wijxj
or in the matrix form
F (W,X) = AIWX,
where A = {Ai}, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, is a column vector of individual shocks and I is an n-by-n
identity matrix.
All-equity case A cost of use of industry i’s product is ki, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. The cor-
porate tax rate is τ . Given this setup, the profit of an industry i — in the case when it is
financed by equity completely is
piUi (x1) =
(
Ai
n∑
j=1
wijxj −
n∑
j=1
wijkjxj
)
(1− τ),
which for unlevered firm coincides with the cash flow to shareholders CFUi =
(
Ai
n∑
j=1
wijxj−
n∑
j=1
wijkjxj
)
(1− τ).
Debt-financing case Further, we assume that all industries have some debt load,5 which
is represented by a coupon payment ci paid at the end of the period. Then the profit of a
levered industry takes the following form:
pii(x1, ci) = (Ai
n∑
j=1
wijxj −
n∑
j=1
wijkjxj − ci)(1− τ)
consumes around 92% of its own output.
4This assumption makes all products in the economy perfect substitutes. In the combination with the
assumption that an agent cannot switch its suppliers this feature allows the industries to absorb their
production shocks but does not allow them to substitute a given supply good by the increased amount of
any alternative input.
Chu (2012) uses a CES production function but with a constant elasticity of substitution across different
agents and with no individual shocks.
At the same time the linearity of the function guarantees the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
5This assumption is quite realistic: in 1962 – 2011 among 119 industries, there are only 49 cases with
zero industry-level debt.
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and the cash flow to shareholders includes the tax shield ciτ
CFi =
(
Ai
n∑
j=1
wijxj −
n∑
j=1
wijkjxj − ci
)
(1− τ) + ciτ.
However, the shareholders of the agent i receive the entire cash flow only in the case
when, first, its own shock was mild and, second, all industry’s suppliers stay solvent. Default
in this model means that an industry’s net profit is not sufficient to cover coupon payments
and that it does not deliver its output to its client/customer industries, xj = 0. If an
industry i defaults, its shareholders receive zero cash flow CFi,D = 0.
The cash flow of the solvent industry with a number of failed suppliers reduces to
CFi,ξk =
(
Ai
n∑
j=1,j 6∈ξk
wijxj −
n∑
j=1,j 6∈ξk
wijkjxj − ci
)
(1− τ) + ciτ,
where ξk is a set of defaulted firms in the economy.
The outcome - defaulting, being hit by a shock, or staying completely solvent - depends
on the distribution of the production shocks. Let us denote Di a zone where the shocks
outcome lead to a default of the industry i. Di,ξk is a zone where the industry i stays solvent
but does not receive all the inputs required by the production technology and thus receives
only a “partial” cash flow. Finally, D stands for the zone where the industry i receives all
its proper inputs.
Combining these three regions: where the industry i’s shareholders receive (a) no profit,
(b) “partial” profit, and (c) “entire” profit, we compute the value to the shareholders:
Vi(xi, ci) =
∫
· · ·
∫
Di
CFi,D dA1 . . . dAn + (2.1a)
+
n∑
k=1
∑
ξk
∫
· · ·
∫
Di,ξk
CFi,ξk dA1 . . . dAn + (2.1b)
+
∫
· · ·
∫
D
CFi dA1 . . . dAn. (2.1c)
In order to find the optimal reply functions, we need to define first order conditions:
∂Vi
∂ci
= 0 ⇒ ci = c∗i (xk, Aˇk, Aˆk) (2.2)
and then embedding the optimal capital structure function c∗i (xk, Aˇk, Aˆk) function into the
shareholders’ value, find the optimal production plan
∂Vi
∂xi
∣∣∣
ci=c∗i (xk,Aˇk,Aˆk)
= 0 ⇒ xi = x∗i (Aˇk, Aˆk).
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a set of coupons (ci) and production decisions (xi) such
that industries maximise their value to shareholders taking the network and spot market
prices as given and market clearing condition holds.
Below we focus on the optimal capital structure policy ci and leave the discussion of the
optimal output decision xi out of focus of this paper.
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2.2.2 Default zones
As it was partly covered in the previous section, to describe the first order condition (2.2)
correctly, we pay closer attention to the mechanism of default. The model distinguish two
types of defaults:
• An independent default happens because of the severity of the shock Ai, under the
condition that all deliveries have been made properly.
If the shock Ai is very severe, the earnings before interest are not sufficient to pay the
coupon and the industry i defaults:
Ai
n∑
j=1
wijxj −
n∑
j=1
wijkjxj < ci
The same threshold applies when agents defaulted independently of each other:
Ai1,ξ0 ≤
ci +
n∑
j=1
wijkjxj
n∑
j=1
wijxj
,
where ξk denotes the set of k defaulted counteragents.
• A spillover default happens because at least one of i’s suppliers fails to deliver; the
individual shock of the industry i is not strong enough to make it default but together
with insufficient input, it brings the industry to the default.
Ai
n∑
j=1,j 6∈ξk
wijxj −
n∑
j=1,j 6∈ξk
wijkjxj < ci ⇒ Ai,ξk ≤
ci +
n∑
j=1,j 6∈ξk
wijkjxj
n∑
j=1,j 6∈ξk
wijxj
(2.3)
Thus, every industry has a set of thresholds which monotonically increase along the
number of defaulting counterparts:
Aˇi < Ai1,ξ0 < Ai1,ξ1 < · · · < Ai,ξn−1 < Aˆi
At the same time, a good shock can rescue an industry from bankruptcy.6 The higher
the positive shock, the more resistant an industry is to the lack of pre-ordered inputs. For
an extreme event, when all industries but one default, there is a threshold Ai,ξn−1 . Then
[Ai,ξn−1 , Aˆi] is a safe interval. If industry i shock falls on it, the industry does not depend
on lack of deliveries and survives.
Thus to describe a map of joint defaults and the three parts of value to shareholders
(2.1), we define 3 zones with respect to cash flows of industry i :
• i defaults
Di : Ai < A...∏
j 6=i,j 6∈ξk
Aˆj−Aj,ξk
Aˆj−Aˇj
∏
j∈ξk
Aj,ξk−Aˇj
Aˆj−Aˇj
1
Aˆi−Aˇi
CFi,D = 0
6In this paper we do not distinguish between bankruptcy and default. In our setup we do not specify
that the industries are mutual debtholders and, thus, they do not recover any value of a bankrupt industry.
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• k industries default defaults and i is not among them
Di,ξk : ∃j 6= i Aj < Ai1,ξk∏
j 6=i,j 6∈ξk
Aˆj−Aj,ξk
Aˆj−Aˇj
∏
j∈ξk
Aj,ξk−Aˇj
Aˆj−Aˇj
1
Aˆi−Aˇi
CFi,ξk =
(
Ai
n∑
j=1,j 6∈ξk
wijxi −
n∑
j=1,j 6∈ξk
wijkjxi − ci
)
(1− τ) + ciτ
• no one defaults
D : ∀j Aj > Ai1,ξn∏
j 6=i
Aˆj−Aj,ξk
Aˆj−Aˇj
1
Aˆi−Aˇi
CFi =
(
Ai
n∑
j=1
wijxj −
n∑
j=1
wijkjxj − ci
)
(1− τ) + ciτ
Here we study the optimal capital structure changes in response to the change of pa-
rameters: weighting matrix W , distributions of production shocks [Aˇi, Aˆi], etc.
2.2.3 Model Timeline
The model is one-period and its timeline is split by the realisation of the production shocks
into two parts: before and after shocks. Figure 2.1 illustrates it. Before the shocks the
industries make their capital structure and then production decisions taking into account
their counteragents’ behaviour. After the shocks the economy realises which industries have
to default and then solvent industries make payments to their stakeholders.
Shocks
Coupon decision
ci
Production decision
xi
Independent defaults
Ai,ξ0
Spillover defaults
Ai,ξm
Before shocks After shocks
Figure 2.1: reports the timeline of the model. before the shocks: companies make their capital
structure and production decisions, shocks are realised, after the shocks: the companies make pay-
ments. Before the shocks are realized, the agents, first, make their decisions about borrowing and
then about output magnitude. After the shocks have been realised, the agents state their default or
solvency independently and together with the other agents in the economy.
Even though the defaults happen simultaneously, once the industries learn the magni-
tude of the shocks in the economy, they still differ in nature (independent and spillover
defaults). To understand the logic of the spillover mechanism we look at the more detailed
timeline of the model.
Before shocks. Step 1: Industries choose their coupons in order to maximize the value of the firm
(for the shareholders):
ci = c
∗
i (xkj), k, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
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Before shocks. Step 2: Given the optimal debt levels, the industries choose their inputs xi and
preorder them:
xi = x
∗
i (wkj , Ak), k, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
After shocks. Step 1: Production shocks happen and all industries learn which of them are going
to default now. Only “independent” defaults are announced. This is the first
wave of defaults.
After shocks. Step 2: Industries, which shocks were not high enough to default independently, re-
alise whether they are going to default because of delivery failure. This is the
second wave of defaults.
...
After shocks. Step k: Industries which have not defaulted after all waves of defaults produce, repay
their coupons, and receive their profits. Payments to suppliers happen, only
after a successful delivery. Thus, if the supplier failed to deliver the good,
the customer does not bear the cost kj of buying it.
2.2.4 Example of an economy consisting of three industries
For the sake of tractability, we consider an example with three agents and present numer-
ical results. Figure 2.2 presents three networks of different structures: isolated agents in
Panel 2.2a, linear/star-shaped economy in Panel 2.2b, and circular economy in Panel 2.2c.
In the first case all industries are isolated and, thus, make their decisions independently; a
shock that hits one of them does not affect the other nodes of the network. In the linear
economy a central node is clearly seen: the node 2 as presented in the figure. The shock
of the industry 1 never affects the industry 3 directly, only through a neighbour effect, i.e.
through the node 2. In the circular economy all industries are interconnected, any produc-
tion shock will hit every industry in the economy. Below we discuss how a position of an
industry in the economy becomes a determinant of its capital structure.
Figure 2.3a reports conditional default zones for a fully interconnected economy. As
there are three industries, they produce three default zones and one non-default zone. The
shock of industry 1 moves along axis x, the shocks of industries 2 and 3 along axes y and z
respectively. Red zone corresponds to an “independent” default of industry 1. Orange zone
describes a conditional default of industry 1 when one and only one counteragent defaults.
Yellow zone shows a zone of conditional default of industry 1 when both counterparties
default. Transparent zone corresponds to the higher shock and describes the non-default
zone for industry 1. We see that the red zone is a layer which covers the plane:
A1 ∈ [Aˇ1, A1,ξ0 ], A2 ∈ [Aˇ2, Aˆ2], A3 ∈ [Aˇ3, Aˆ3],
meaning that under any shocks for industries 2 and 3 industry 1 defaults, as its own shock
is below an independent threshold.
The orange zone corresponds to two intersecting stripes:
A1 ∈ [A1,ξ0 , A1,ξ1 ], A2 ∈ [Aˇ2, A2,ξ0 ], A3 ∈ [Aˇ3, Aˆ3],
and
A1 ∈ [A1,ξ0 , A1,ξ1 ], A2 ∈ [Aˇ2, Aˆ2], A3 ∈ [Aˇ3, A3,ξ0 ],
12
1w11
2w22
3 w33
(a) Isolated Industries
1
w11
w21
2
w12
w22
w32
3
w23
w33
(b) Linear/Star-shaped Economy
1
w11
w21
w31
2
w12
w22
w32
3
w13
w23
w33
(c) Circular economy
Figure 2.2: demonstrates 3 potential shapes of three-industry economy. Panel 2.2a presents isolated
industries. All industries are isolated and, thus, make their decisions independently; a shock that
hits one of them does not affect the other nodes of the network. Panel 2.2b corresponds to a linear
(or star-shaped)economy. In this type of the economy a central node is clearly seen: the node 2
as presented in the figure. The shock of the industry 1 never affects the industry 3 directly, only
through a neighbour effect, i.e. through the node 2. Panel 2.2c depicts a circular economy. Here all
industries are interconnected, any production shock will hit every industry in the economy.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2.3: illustrates 3 types of default of industry 1 with respect to production shocks of all three
industries in a fully interconnected economy. The shock of industry 1 moves along axis x, the shocks
of industries 2 and 3 along axes y and z respectively. Red zone corresponds to an “independent”
default of industry 1. Orange zone describes a conditional default of industry 1 when one and only
one counteragent defaults. Yellow zone shows a zone of conditional default of industry 1 when
both counterparties default. Transparent zone corresponds to the higher shock and describes the
non-default zone for industry 1.
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meaning that a default of at least one counterparty will hit vulnerable industry 1 hard
enough to default.
The yellow zone is described as follows:
A1 ∈ [A1,ξ2 , A1,ξ2 ], A2 ∈ [Aˇ2, A2,ξ0 ], A3 ∈ [Aˇ3, A3,ξ0 ].
It is worth noting that there is a part of an orange zone where both counteragents default
as well. However, we distinguish the colours with respect to the degree of vulnerability of
industry 1, not the number of defaulting industries.
The rest of the space that fills the parallelepiped up to the point (Aˆ1, Aˆ2, Aˆ3) is trans-
parent and describes the zone where industry 1 does not default under any circumstances.
Figure 2.3b presents the same default zones only presented in slice-by-slice.
Figure 2.4 reports dynamics of coupons for industries 1 and 2. The blue line depicts
the dynamics of industry 1’s coupon. The orange line depicts the dynamics of industry
2’s coupon. The left hand side column reports the graphs for interconnected case: when
industry 1 consumes product of industry 2. The right hand side column stands for an
independent industry 1. The first row exhibits dynamics of optimal coupons (y-axis) over
the cost of product 2 (x-axis). In the left column we see that as the use of product 2 becomes
more expensive, industry 1 has less resources to pay out its debt and, thus, it prefers to
reduce its optimal coupon. In the right column the cost of product 2 does not affect coupon
1 in any way, because it does not depend on supplies of product 2.
The second row reports dynamics of optimal coupons (y-axis) along the top limit of
the production shock (x-axis). In the left column the optimal coupon 1 increases along the
upper boundary of industry 2’s product shock Aˆ2. As the next panel shows, the essential
reason of this growth is the increase of the corresponding mean, A¯2. As expected, in the
right column the coupon 1 is not affected by the change of parameters in industry 2.
The third row presents dynamics of optimal coupons (y-axis) along the volatility of
production shock 2, its mean stays unchanged (x-axis). We see that in both columns the
coupon 1 stays unchanged. It can be explained by the setup in which the volatility of a
production shock does not affect coupon 1.
Figure 2.5 reports dynamics of coupons for industries 1, 2, and 3. The size of a coupon is
measured along y-axis. Along x-axis grows the weight of product 2 as an input of industry
1 (w12); w11 stays constant at the level of 10%; w13 is decreasing along x-axis. The blue
line depicts the dynamics of industry 1’s coupon. The orange line depicts the dynamics of
industry 2’s coupon. The yellow line depicts the dynamics of industry 3’s coupon. Panel 2.5a
reports the case when the distributions of production shocks in industry 2 and 3 are the
same, however, the cost of product 3 is 10 times higher than the cost of product 2. Industries
2 and 3 are supplied by their own product completely. We notice the contrast between the
level of coupons 2 and 3: product 3 is so expensive that industry 3 cannot issue any debt.
The more industry 1 switches to product 2, the higher coupon industry 1 can afford.
Panel 2.5b reports the case when the proportion of costs remains unchanged: the cost of
product 3 is 10 times higher than the cost of product 2, and the production shock interval
of industry 3 shift upwards, i.e. both its bottom and top extremes are higher than in the
previous case. The coupon 2 remained unchanged, as none of parameters of industry 2 have
changed. Industry 3 issues coupon now, because its production shock is much higher.
Panel 2.5c show the setup identical in everything but inputs x12 and x13, which are
twice as higher as in Panel 2.5b. In this case the increasing dynamics of coupon 1 remains,
however the pace of the growth changes due to the new weights.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 2.4: reports dynamics of coupons for industries 1 and 2. The blue line depicts the dynamics
of industry 1’s coupon. The orange line depicts the dynamics of industry 2’s coupon. The left
hand side column reports the graphs for interconnected case: when industry 1 consumes product of
industry 2. The right hand side column stands for an independent industry 1. The first row exhibits
dynamics of optimal coupons (y-axis) over the cost of product 2 (x-axis). The second row reports
dynamics of optimal coupons (y-axis) along the top limit of the production shock (x-axis). The
third row presents dynamics of optimal coupons (y-axis) along the volatility of production shock 2,
its mean stays unchanged (x-axis).
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 2.5: reports dynamics of coupons for industries 1, 2, and 3. The size of a coupon is measured
along y-axis. Along x-axis grows the weight of product 2 as an input of industry 1 (w12); w11 stays
constant at the level of 10%; w13 is decreasing along x-axis. The blue line depicts the dynamics of
industry 1’s coupon. The orange line depicts the dynamics of industry 2’s coupon. The yellow line
depicts the dynamics of industry 3’s coupon. Panel 2.5a reports the case when the distributions
of production shocks in industry 2 and 3 are the same, however, the cost of product 3 is 10 times
higher than the cost of product 2. Panel 2.5b reports the case when the proportion of costs remains
unchanged: the cost of product 3 is 10 times higher than the cost of product 2, and the production
shock interval of industry 3 shift upwards, i.e. both its bottom and top extremes are higher than in
the previous case. Panel 2.5c show the setup identical in everything but inputs x12 and x13, which
are twice as higher as in Panel 2.5b.
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In the above figures, there is no direct response by capital structure decision of one
industry onto capital structure decision of an other one (c1 6= c1(c2)), rather the response
is on the characteristics of the counteragent (c1 = c
∗
1(k2, Aˇ2, Aˆ2, ...)). So it is a similar in
spirit to spatial-error model rather than spatial-autoregressive model.
Figure 2.6 reports dynamics of coupons for the industry 1 along its measures of centrality.
The size of a coupon is measured along y-axis. In Panel 2.6a long x-axis the weight of input
of its own product grows. In other words, the points closer to the origin correspond to a
more connected node and the weight equal to one stands for an isolated industry. This is
reverse to the in-degree measure change, i.e., the weaker is isolation, the more counterparts
an industry has and, thus, the higher the in-degree measure is. And an independent industry
has zero trading connections and a zero in-degree measure. In Panel 2.6b the eigen centrality
of industry 1 is measured along y-axis. The matrix of input-output weights provides a set
of of eigenvalues and eigenvectors. The eigen centrality equals a corresponding coordinate
in the eigenvector associated with the highest eigenvalue. The details of different centrality
measures are discuused in Section 2.4.1. This figure illustrates the hypotheses, which are
tested in the empirical part of the paper: the leverage of more connected industries is higher.
(a) (b)
Figure 2.6: reports dynamics of coupons for the industry 1 along its measures of centrality. The
size of a coupon is measured along y-axis. In Panel 2.6a long x-axis the weight of input of its own
product grows. In other words, the points closer to the origin correspond to a more connected node
and the weight equal to one stands for an isolated industry. This is reverse to the in-degree measure
change, i.e., the weaker is isolation, the more counterparts an industry has and, thus, the higher
the in-degree measure is. And an independent industry has zero trading connections and a zero
in-degree measure. In Panel 2.6b the eigen centrality of industry 1 is measured along y-axis. This
figure illustrates the hypotheses, which are tested in the empirical part of the paper: the leverage of
more connected industries is higher.
The spatial-autoregressive perspective is illustrated in Figure 2.7. Panels 2.7a and 2.7b
demonstrates the contrast between two sets of parameters under which capital structure of
industry 1 responds positively or negatively on the increase of industry 2’s coupon. The
comparative elasticity in these two figures shows that a negative response is more likely.
2.3 Data
The model in the previous section provides two predictions: the leverage of more connected
industries is higher and industries are likely to decrease their leverage in response to the
increase of counterpart’s leverage.
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.7: reports dynamics of coupons for industries 1 and 2. The size of a coupon is measured
along y-axis. Along x-axis grows the coupon of industry 2 as an inputs of industry 1 (w11); w12 stay
constant at the level of 50%; w13 is zero. The blue line depicts the dynamics of industry 1’s coupon.
The orange line depicts the dynamics of industry 2’s coupon. Panel 2.7a reports the case when the
coupons of industry 1 and 2 co-move. Panel 2.7b reports the case when the coupon of industry 1
responds negatively to industry 2’s capital structure.
2.3.1 Data selection.
We use annual data from a merged CRSP-Compustat database for companies with head-
quarters in the USA from 1962 to 2012. The time period is chosen to provide non-missing
data on dependent and explanatory variables (listed in Section 5). The data sample includes
50,088 firm-year observations. We winsorize ratios at 1 and 99 percentile levels to prevent
the outliers from affecting the analysis. We exclude financials (NAICS starts with 52),
utilities (NAICS starts with 22), and government entities (NAICS starts with letters).
The former have specific capital structure regulations. The second are usually thoroughly
monitored by the community and government, and thus are constrained in leverage deci-
sion making, and might be prevented from defaults due to the significance of their business
to a population. The latter group may not be profit-oriented, so the principles of their
functioning, and among others issuing debt, may be different.
2.3.2 Data Description.
The winsorized sample companies’ market leverage ratios vary from 0 to 2.282 (though
the 99 percentile corresponds to the market leverage level of 0.9) with a median market
leverage of 0.170. The size of the company has a range from -6.908 to 12.98 (the negative
value appears due to the construction of the ratio — firm size is the logarithm of its sales),
the market-to-book ratio ranges from 0.0132 to 80.830, the profitability varies from -21.290
to 1.984, the asset tangibility varies from 0 to 0.999. The basic summary statistics for the
data in levels is presented in the Table 2.1.
2.3.3 Industry Connections.
To describe the interactions between industries we use the input-output use matrix from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Each cell in this matrix describes how much of the
corresponding row industry’s output the corresponding column industry consumes. The
data is presented in producers’ prices. The results in this paper are calculated with the
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for Leverage and Control Variables. The sample
consists of firms from the merged CRSP-Compustat database for companies with headquar-
ters in the USA from 2003 to 2014 on the annual base. Financials (historical SIC or SIC
between 4900 and 4949), utilities (historical SIC or SIC codes between 6000 and 6999), and
government entities (NAICS starts with letters) are excluded from the sample. All variables
are winsorised at 1% and 99%. Values are shown to three significant decimal places.
Centrality Measure Mean Median s.d. Min Max
Book Leverage (Colla et al., 2013) 0.286 0.253 0.264 0.000 24.610
Book Leverage (Uysal, 2011) 0.552 0.512 0.463 0.009 62.720
Market Leverage (Colla et al., 2013) 0.293 0.238 0.239 0.000 0.998
Size 4.997 5.028 2.203 -7.034 12.620
Market-to-Book ratio 1.174 0.738 1.695 0.001 74.260
Profitability 0.075 0.119 0.280 -21.290 1.984
Assets Tangibility 0.323 0.269 0.229 0.000 1.000
R&D Dummy (Uysal, 2011) 0.549 1.000 0.498 0.000 1.000
R&D/Total Assets (Uysal, 2011) 0.040 0.000 0.120 0.000 7.796
Cash Holdings 0.119 0.056 0.161 0.000 0.993
Observations 88’595
2002 matrix, in which industries (and corresponding output products) are split into 127
groups.
The position of an industry in the network is defined by the number of connections
with other industries and the magnitude of each. The first property is described by an
adjacency matrix. Its element is one if there exists a corresponding product-industry link
and zero otherwise, the diagonal elements are set to be zeros. The second is described by the
weighting matrix. Each cell in the weighting matrix is zero if the corresponding cell in the
adjacency matrix is zero. All other cells are the magnitude of the connection. An alternative
way to describe the strength of dependence between industries is a normalized weighting
matrix. It is a weighting matrix each cell of which is divided by the row industry’s total
output.7 Thus, the sum of a row in the normalized matrix is always one. This transformation
ensures the ties between large and small industries are considered as equally important. For
example, if a small industry supplies most of its output to another small industry, then they
are linked tightly. Without this normalization, this link would be negligibly small in the
presence of large industries. However, we are interested in the relative importance of the
partner industries as well as in the absolute magnitude of inter-industry trading flows. The
difference between the set of the industries with the strongest ties in relative and absolute
terms is presented in Graphs 2.8b and 2.8c.
Formally, those characteristics can be presented in terms of centrality measures. Each of
measure reflects different properties of a node. Out-degree, the average weight of a node’s
outgoing edges, shows the average magnitude of an industry’s customers’ consumption. In-
degree, the average weight of a node’s ingoing edges, shows the average magnitude of an
industry’s suppliers’ input. Eigenvector centrality measures the importance of the industry
in the economy network. The details of construction and interpretation of these and other
7Alternative methods of normalization were used to check the robustness of the results and will be
discussed in Section 2.4.
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(c) Network with 10% of the most expensive trad-
ing ties shown
Figure 2.8: reports a network of trading relations between the U.S. industries in 2002. The top left
sub-figure represents an entire network. The top right sub-figure depicts the ties corresponding to
the top 10% of row-normalized weights. The bottom sub-figure describes the ties corresponding to
the top 10% of non-normalized weights.
The sub-graphs 2.8b and 2.8c demonstrate the difference between structures of normalized weighting
and non-normalized weighting matrices. Although the trading links can be large in absolute values
— and thus can be included into the plot 2.8c, at the same time they can be out-balanced by
other large flows — and thus become relatively less important and be excluded from the plot 2.8b.
The matrix of relative values is used to analyze the local ”neighbour-to-neighbour” connections, the
matrix of absolute values is used for the global ”throughout a network” relations.
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measures can be found below (Section 2.4.1).
The data on companies was re-aggregated into 107 groups, corresponding to the columns
of the input-output matrix. Some firms from CRSP-Compustat database belong to indus-
tries which are not described in the matrix and so are removed. The summary statistics for
centrality measures can be found at Table 2.2.
Figure 2.9 illustrates the dynamics of in-degree and eigen centrality in 1997–2016. For
the clarity of presentation only two industries are shown: “Apparel and leather and allied
products” industry, which NAICS are 315000 and 316000, and “Primary metals” industry,
which NAICS start with 331. However, the result holds for all industries. This figure also
demonstrates that the chosen scale of an industry is optimal. Bigger industries — with
more commodities per industry — would not show such a vivid dynamics and would not
represent the change of technology and economic conditions. For smaller industries — with
fewer commodities — it is impossible to find data of the same level of reliability.
(a) (b)
Figure 2.9: shows the dynamics of centrality measures: in-degree and eigen centrality. The left
y-axis corresponds to the in-degree mesure, the right y-axis reflects the eigen centrality. Panel 2.9a
stands for “Apparel and leather and allied products” industry (NAICS are 315000 and 316000).
Panel 2.9b stands for “Primary metals” industry (NAICS start with 331).
According to different measures, the same industries can be at the same time core and
peripheral. For instance, Tobacco products have high out-degree and eigenvector centralities
and a low betweenness centrality. This fact can be explained in the following way: this
industry has lots of direct customers and they, in their turn, are connected to many other
industries, but it does not lie on the shortest paths between many industries, it is in the
”blind end” of this customer-supplier chain. The different types of core and peripheral
industries are listed in Table 2.3. If we group the industries along a centrality measure,
we observe the difference in the dynamics of these subsamples. The fact is illustrated in
Figures 2.10a–2.10f and 2.11a–2.12d. They demonstrate the median leverage and industries’
median characteristics’ dynamics of three groups of industries: core, intermediate, and
peripheral. In the left columns of plots the centrality groups are defined with respect to
out-degree centrality and in the right columns they are assigned with respect to eigenvector
centrality. The measures were chosen to underline the presence of a network effect. The
out-degree centrality characterizes the node locally, because it is constructed on the ties to
first-order neighbours. Roughly speaking, this approach is similar to consideration of each
node with its partners separately. While the eigenvector centrality reports the importance of
a node in the entire network. In this case we cannot consider the economy hub-by-hub, but
only all nodes together. The peripheral industries with respect to both local (out-degree)
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics — Measures of Centrality
Centrality measures are computed on the base of the BEA input-output use matrix. The matrix
provides information on how much output of a row industry has been consumed by a column indus-
try. The data is presented in producers’ prices. Adjacency matrix’ elements are 1’s if there exist
corresponding product-industry links and 0 otherwise, the diagonal elements are set to be zeros.
Weighting matrix’ 0 elements coincide with those of the adjacency matrix and 1’s are replaced by
the normalized magnitude of the connections. The normalization was made by dividing each cell by
the sum of the row. Values are shown to three significant decimal places.
Adjacency matrix
Out-degree 0.454 0.138 0.388 0.295 0.882
In-degree 0.676 0.013 0.674 0.656 0.729
Degree 1.126 0.144 1.060 0.959 1.562
Closeness 1.105 0.066 1.124 0.844 1.200
Betweenness 0.366 0.117 0.422 0.003 0.523
Eigenvector 0.049 0.013 0.043 0.031 0.091
Katz-Bonacich 0.036 0.014 0.043 -0.019 0.055
Weighting matrix
Out-degree weighted 280.598 90.770 238.783 192.391 613.550
In-degree weighted 417.457 28.899 414.161 374.234 524.099
Degree weighted 703.960 115.298 672.471 581.162 1069.722
Closeness weighted 413.207 115.540 448.627 0.923 556.023
Betweenness weighted 0.446 0.152 0.514 0.015 0.656
Eigenvector weighted 0.037 0.006 0.034 0.031 0.058
Katz-Bonacich weighted 0.036 0.022 0.033 0.000 0.101
Normalized weighting matrix
Out-degree weighted,normalized 6.766 2.523 7.242 -2.236 14.214
In-degree weighted,normalized 0.008 0.000 0.008 0.007 0.009
Degree weighted,normalized 0.012 0.002 0.012 0.011 0.017
Closeness weighted,normalized 10805.708 3162.548 9360.447 6130.257 20485.073
Betweenness weighted,normalized 8219.340 2900.568 9383.144 0.021 12014.487
Eigenvector weighted,normalized 0.034 0.004 0.032 0.030 0.052
Katz-Bonacich weighted,normalized 4.081 1.254 3.429 2.541 8.532
Observations 50088
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and global (eigenvector) centrality measures have in average higher leverage. Moreover,
book leverages and industries’ characteristics of core and peripheral sectors show different
dynamics as well as different magnitudes.
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2.4 Empirical Evidence
We estimate the two network effects: first, whether and how much the position (centrality)
of an industry in the network influences its capital structure and, second, whether the indus-
try’s leverage is affected by leverages of its suppliers and customers or their characteristics.
2.4.1 Network terminology
Out-degree gauges how connected the vertex is, how many flows (and of which magnitude
— in weighted case) stem from it.
Out-degree is computed as a number (a sum — in weighted the case) of out-flows normalized
by the maximum possible amount of outflows (the number of nodes in the network minus
one).
In-degree measures how connected the vertex is, how many flows (and of which magni-
tude — in weighted case) flow into it.
In-degree is computed as a number (a sum — in the weighted case) of in-flows normalized
by the maximum possible amount of inflows (the number of nodes in the network minus
one).
Betweenness characterizes the importance of the node’s position in the network.
Betweenness of a vertex is computed as a sum over all nodes of the following ratios: in the
numerator there is a number of the shortest paths linking two nodes of a network, different
from the given vertex, routing via this vertex, in the denominator a number of all shortest
paths linking the same two nodes, normalized by the maximum amount of paths a vertex
could lie on between all pairs of other vertex.
Closeness measures how close to the nodes of the reachable subnetwork the vertex is.
The closer to other nodes the vertex is, the higher score it receives.
Closeness is a ratio of the maximum possible number of connections a node can have (the
number of nodes in the network minus one) and the sum of distances from the vertex to all
nodes of the reachable set.
Eigen centrality measures the importance of a vertex. It receives high scores if it has
many neighbours, important neighbours, or both. The idea of this measure coincides with
a concept of eigenvectors. There is the same characteristic on the left- and right-hand sides
of the equation: the higher are the scores of a vertex’s neighbours, the higher scores it has
itself. An eigenvector is a vector of scores, a matrix is an adjacency matrix — thus the
product of the matrix and the vector of the scores provides a summary of the neighbours’
scores — and an eigenvalue is a scaling coefficient.Technically, eigenvector centrality of a
vertex is the corresponding coordinate of the largest eigenvalue’s eigenvector of an adjacency
matrix.
Katz-Bonacich centrality was constructed with logic similar to eigenvector centrality,
but it includes an intercept into the equation and thus guarantees that isolated vertices are
assigned non-zero scores.
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Figure 2.10: demonstrates the median leverage dynamics of three groups of industries: core, in-
termediate, and peripheral. The first row of pictures represents book leverage 1, the second book
leverage 2, and the third market leverage 1. The industries in the figures in the left column are split
with respect to out-degree centrality, and in the right column to eigenvector centrality. Industries
are included in the core (peripheral) group if the corresponding measure of centrality is in the top
(bottom) 25% of all values of centrality measure. The rest of the industries forms the intermediate
group.
The peripheral industries with respect to local (out-degree) and global (eigenvector) centrality mea-
sures have on average higher leverage. Moreover, book leverages of industries of different centrality
show different dynamics as well as different magnitudes.
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Figure 2.11: demonstrates the dynamics of the industries’ characteristics for three groups of in-
dustries: core, intermediate, and peripheral. The first row of pictures represents size, the second
profitability. The industries on the figures in the left column are split with respect to out-degree
centrality, and in the right column to eigenvector centrality. Industries are included in the core (pe-
ripheral) group if the corresponding measure of centrality is in the top (bottom) 25% of all values
of centrality measure. The rest of the industries forms the intermediate group.
The peripheral industries with respect to local (out-degree) and global (eigenvector) centrality mea-
sures show different dynamics as well as different magnitudes.
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Figure 2.12: demonstrates the dynamics of the industries’ characteristics for three groups of indus-
tries: core, intermediate, and peripheral. The first row of pictures represents asset tangibility, the
second R&D expenditures. The industries on the figures in the left column are split with respect to
out-degree centrality, and in the right column to eigenvector centrality. Industries are included in
the core (peripheral) group if the corresponding measure of centrality is in the top (bottom) 25% of
all values of centrality measure. The rest of the industries forms the intermediate group.
The peripheral industries with respect to local (out-degree) and global (eigenvector) centrality mea-
sures show different dynamics as well as different magnitudes.
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2.4.2 Industry centrality
The first effect is estimated by a regression
y = α+Xβ + Cγ + ε,
where y is a measure of capital policy, X are capital structure determinants, C is one of
the measures of centrality, ε is a vector of errors, and (α′, β′, γ) is a vector of parameters.
We used four proxies for leverage ratio as dependent variables: a ratio of total debt to
total book assets, a ratio of total liabilities to total book assets, and a ratio of total debt
to market value of assets (calculated in two alternative ways). Capital structure determi-
nants were chosen according to Leary and Roberts (2014), Frank and Goyal (2009), and
Kale and Shahrur (2007): size, profitability, asset tangibility, market-to-book ratio, prod-
uct uniqueness (R&D), cash holdings. As a proxy for industry competition and bargaining
power a concentration variable was used. Plus we included a lagged dependent variable,
since leverage is an inert ratio. We use this ”standard” set of explanatory variables sep-
arately and with a measure of centrality. The latter included out-, in-degree, closeness,
betweenness, eigenvector, Katz-Bonacich measures for adjacency, weighting, and normal-
ized weighting matrices. A more detailed discussion of the explanatory variables can be
found in Appendix (Section 5).
2.4.3 Interaction with the trading partners
The second effect can be split into two parts: partners’ actions and determinants of their
behaviour. We estimate the direct reaction on the partners’ behaviour with a spatial-
autoregressive model
y = α+ λWy +Xβ + u,
where y is a measure of capital policy, W is the weighting matrix, X is the firm’s charac-
teristic matrix (including concentration), u is the error vector, and (α′, λ, β′) is a vector of
parameters. The regression estimates the network effect by the λWy term. The parameter
λ captures the reaction of industries on their partners’ capital structure decisions. If it
is positive, then on average industries tend to increase their leverage along those of their
neighbours. A negative coefficient suggests that they reduce their debt load in response
to the growth of their partners’ leverage. The inclusion of a dependent variable into the
right-hand side of the regression creates a threat of spill-overs. We will describe how we
treat them below, in the Method subsection.
A spatial approach is appropriate here, because unlike in a traditional econometric
model, observations can be dependent. In a spatial terminology, a unit can affect the be-
haviour or characteristics of the nearby regions through the common border. If we consider
customers and suppliers as neighbours, the nodes which are linked by the common edge, we
observe the same effect. The observations are no longer independent, their characteristics
and decisions can change the actions of the other industries.
According the procedure of spatial model estimation, the weighting matrix must be
exogenous to the units’ characteristics. We use a matrix of trading connections between
agents. It is perfectly legitimate, as it comes from an economic dimension, while the capital
structure decision is made in a financial dimension. Although there exists literature8 on
how intra-industry competition affects capital structure, it is not a concern here, since we
focus the inter-industry connections.
8Brander and Lewis (1986), Leary and Roberts (2014), Zhdanov (2007).
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In order to ensure the input-output matrix is a valid weighting matrix, we must nor-
malize it. The basic approach is a row normalization: each element is divided by the sum
of its corresponding row. We also use two alternative techniques: spectral and minmax.
Spectral normalization means that each element of the matrix is divided by the absolute
value of the largest eigenvalue of the matrix. In the minmax normalization procedure each
element is divided by the minimum between the maximum of row sums and the maximum of
column sums. The row normalization equalizes large and small industries. Each connection
becomes as strong, as important it is for the current industry. Thus the regressions with a
row-normalized matrix better describe the local network effect. On the contrary, spectral
and minmax normalizations scale the whole matrix with the same numbers, preserving all
existing proportions. These normalizations provide more similar to each other results (as
it can be seen in Figures 2.13a–2.13p) and describe the global network effect.
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The direct reaction to the changes in leverages of customers and suppliers seems to be the
most obvious channel. But industry’s partners can experience shocks in their characteristics
and environment, and through these affect the industry in question, while maintaining a
constant leverage. To estimate this shock transmission channel, we use a spatial-error
model: {
y = α+Xβ + u,
u = ρWu+ v.
The notation is the same as before; v denotes an error vector and ρ is a coefficient to
estimate. Here the network structure is imposed upon the errors of the regression. It does
not specify how the shock is carried through the network. But paired with the previous
regression, it can shed light on how active non-leverage channels are.
2.4.4 Method
Spatial models have a challenge of collinearity between average peers’ outcome and average
peers’ characteristics. The estimation in this paper was made under the condition that the
difference of an identity matrix and a product of a spatial coefficient and a weighting matrix
is invertible.9
2.4.5 Results
Industry centrality. The first model was estimated by three methods: as a panel re-
gression with fixed (Table 2.4) and random10 effects and by Fama-MacBeth procedure (Ta-
ble 2.5) in levels. The comparison of the results lets us conclude that they are robust to the
method of estimation. The inclusion of the measures of centrality does not cause a signifi-
cant change in the estimates of other coefficients. We observe this effect due to correlations
between the explanatory variables (which can be found in Table 2.6). In case of in-degree
centrality measure, it explains the previously unexplained variation of leverage without af-
fecting the explanatory power of the other determinants. The principal component statistics
(Table 2.7 and Figures 2.14b and 2.14a) supports our inference.
9For details, see Drukker et al. (2011).
10As the sample covers the major U.S. industries, the model with fixed effects is more legitimate here. The
estimation with random effects was made to check the robustness of the results, the results are unreported.
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Figure 2.14: demonstrates the results of Principle Component Analysis. The left sub-figure is a
loading plot and the right one is a scree plot of the eigenvalues of a correlation matrix.
On the example of in-degree variable, we see that a position of an agent in the network (characterized
by a centrality measure) explains previously unexplained variation of leverage without affecting the
explanatory power of other determinants.
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Table 2.7: Principle Component Analysis — Component Loadings
The leading eigenvectors from the eigen decomposition of the correlation matrix of the variables.
On the example of in-degree variable, we see that a position of an agent in the network (characterized
by a centrality measure) explains previously unexplained variation of leverage without affecting the
explanatory power of other determinants.
e(L)
Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5
Size .5243369 .0068677 -.3522992 .572729 -.5223892
Market-to-Book -.5236009 -.1213801 .0328925 .7836154 .3097966
Profitability .5738385 .0233254 -.18803 .0816039 .7925597
Assets Tangibility .3409109 -.0223675 .9156713 .2057039 -.0501143
In-degreeweighted normalized -.0734993 .9920561 .0315296 .0946313 .0217559
The positive coefficient before in- and out-degrees11 suggests that the more in- and out-
connections an industry has, the higher its leverage tends to be. The direction of causality
is not clear from this regression. Either the industry which acquires new suppliers chooses
to increase its debt-to-assets ratio, or after the industry raises its leverage, it feels more
free to interact with a higher number of suppliers. In either case we do not know anything
about the structure of these supply ties: they could be homogeneous, or they could vary
considerably across partners. The regression with weighted measures of centrality partially
answers these questions. The interpretation of a positive coefficient here is more clear: the
more singular suppliers or customers with strong ties the industry has, the larger its debt
load tends to be. The interpretation of coefficients for other measures of centrality are
similar. For betweenness, the more important link in a several-industries-long upstream-
downstream chain an industry is, the higher its leverage tends to be. For eigenvector, the
higher the amount of the neighbours of an industry and the bigger these neighbours are,
the larger leverage the industry is prone to have.
Interaction with the trading partners. The model is estimated cross-sectionally, in
levels, year-by-year. The average, across time, coefficients are reported in Table 2.8. The
dynamics of the coefficients is shown in Figures 2.13a–2.13p.The parameter corresponding
to the autoregressive component is positive in line with our hypothesis of leverage as an
instrument to improve an industry’s bargaining position.
Bronars and Deere (1991) demonstrate the use of debt as a negotiating tool between
firms (in the role of customers) and employees (in the role of labour suppliers). They argue
that when firms issue more debt, then they reduce the proportion of surplus that a workers’
union can extract. In their paper the optimal structure is obtained through a trade-off
between wealth gain from the reduction in the union’s part of surplus and the firms’s
bankruptcy costs. Maksimovic and Titman (1991) derive a consequence of this mechanism.
They show that higher levered firms are less likely to invest in its reputation and produce
high-quality products. This effect is an illustration that using debt as a bargaining tool
is a substitute to its use as a commitment instrument. In the latter case a firm would
be interested in investing in its own reputation to encourage its suppliers to undertake
firm-specific investment.
The spatial-autoregressive model confirms the hypothesis that firms react directly to
11The unreported results for different capital policy proxies and centrality measures support the positive
relation.
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Table 2.8: Coefficients - Dynamic Spatial Models
The table reports average over time dimension coefficients of cross-sectionally estimated year-by-year
Spatial-Autoregressive and Spatial-Error Models. The time period is from 1969 till 2011.
Spatial-Autoregressive Models Spatial-Error Models
λrow λminmax λspectral ρrow ρminmax ρspectral
In levels
Book Leverage 1 .02735777 .0098585 .01508651 .0098585 .01675604 .01508651
Book Leverage 2 .03091664 .02359696 .02920189 .02359696 .0318319 .02920189
Market Leverage 1 .02479033 .01856751 .02253783 .01856751 .02410329 .02253783
Market Leverage 2 .02621361 .01813967 .02260352 .01813967 .02349898 .02260352
In differences
Book Leverage 1 -.00102788 -.00124657 -.00211773 -.00124657 -.00102334 -.00211773
Book Leverage 2 -.0045568 -.00434462 -.00553487 -.00434463 -.00492667 -.00553487
Market Leverage 1 .0005835 .00021272 -.00032128 .00021272 -.00036233 -.00032128
Market Leverage 2 .00009513 -.00029905 -.00085159 -.00029935 -.00094283 -.00085159
the leverage of their partners. Alternative channels of shock transmission require further
research.
2.5 Conclusion
The main result of the paper is that a significant network effect in capital structure decision
making was found. There are two main components of it. The first is the dependence
of industry’s capital structure policy on its position in the network. The less diversified
industry’s suppliers or customer are, the lower its leverage tends to be. The second is the
dependence of industry’s capital structure policy on its partner industries’ decisions. The
relation is positive, meaning that the industries are prone to raise their own leverage in the
response to the increase of their partners’ leverage. This conclusion supports the theory
that leverage is partly used as an instrument to improve agent’s bargaining power.
Our numerical results reinforce intuitive predictions about capital structure decisions
in an interconnected economy. In the future research we will focus on developing a more
elaborate model and addressing to the contrasts of industry-level and individual firm-level
product network.
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Chapter 3
Leverage as a Commitment Tool in
Product Market Networks
Does the position of a firm in the product market network affect its capital structure? I
show that every new supply contract will on average lead to a drop of 0.1% in market
leverage and the “strategic” positioning of the firm in the trading network is important.
The effect does not disappear if I control for the proximity to the final consumer. I use novel
data describing the product market network on three levels: supply chain flows, competition
relation, and partnership connections. I confirm that more central firms demonstrate better
economic performance. Peripheral, in terms of competition, firms tend to have higher
leverage. Several statistical tests make the interpretation of Partner network as a mild form
of supplier-customer network plausible.
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Motivation
The idea that firms make their decisions in active interaction with other economic agents
rather than in isolation has gained a lot of popularity recently. Capital structure policy have
not been an exception. Researchers have approached this topic from various angles. There
are multiple papers showing that CEOs and directors sitting on different companies’ boards
who attended the same school, shared an office once, or play golf at the same club will likely
follow similar financial policies (Bouwman (2011), Fracassi (2013), Gygax, Hazledine, and
Spencer (2016)). Under these circumstances, objective characteristics of a company such
as the size of its assets, its profitability, the proportion of tangible assets, etc. become of
secondary importance.
An alternative facet of active inter-company interaction is vertical integration. Some
papers show that group-affiliated companies tend to have higher leverage than their isolated
counterparts (Manos, Murinde, and Green (2007)).
All these papers seem to agree that the more central firms (either in terms of connections
of their managers and directors or in the terms of in- and out-source manufacturing) tend
to make less idiosyncratic decisions and tend to ignore the fundamentals. These findings
can help to resolve the empirical capital structure puzzle.
One of the most important forms of inter-firm communication is their interaction in
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product market. Companies trade supplies, produce their goods, and deliver to their cus-
tomers. During production cycles a natural disaster, a strike, or unexpected change in
regulation can happen. It might disorganise delivery process and require time to recover
the supply chain. We see that in reality companies are quite sensitive to supply shocks,
irrelevant of what was the reason for the shock. Here is a quote of how Johnson&Johnson
raise their concern in their annual report, form 10-K, 20161:
Some important factors that could cause the Company’s actual results to differ
materially from those expressed or implied in the Company’s forward-looking
statements are as follows:
...
Financial distress and bankruptcies experienced by significant customers and
suppliers that could impair their ability, as the case may be, to purchase the
Company’s products, pay for products previously purchased or meet their obli-
gations to the Company under supply arrangements;
...
Such concerns make companies very cautious while selecting suppliers. Once the contract
is signed, both parties have good incentives to commit to the agreement. One of the
reasons being charges for the preliminary ending of a contract. Another is search and
switching costs, which can be quite large sometimes. For example, up to August 2016,
the US Food and Drug Administration prescribed pharmaceutical companies to apply for
a prior approval supplement (PAS) if they wanted to switch to an alternative supplier of
hard gelatin capsules used for proper dosage of drugs. Since then the regulation has been
softened: now pharmaceuticals have to request for an approval only if the capsules differ
from the original ones.2 Obviously such regulation imposes extra legal and time switching
costs on companies.
Firms try to remove the necessity of nonvolunteer replacement of its trading partner.
They try to guarantee the execution of the delivery contract. For this purpose they impose
fees, offer access to new markets, adjust their pricing, etc.
All the measures discussed are applied to reinforce already existing connections. Strate-
gically, however, a company can apply the same criteria to itself. In other words, it should
understand how easily its supplier or its customer can replace a link between them. John-
son&Johnson describe the perceived potential threats to their relations with suppliers and
customers as follows:3:
Interruptions and delays in manufacturing operations could adversely affect the
Company’s business, sales and reputation. The Company’s manufacture of prod-
ucts requires the timely delivery of sufficient amounts of complex, high-quality
components and materials. These subsidiaries operate 119 manufacturing fa-
cilities as well as sourcing from hundreds of suppliers around the world. The
Company has in the past, and may in the future, face unanticipated interrup-
tions and delays in manufacturing through its internal or external supply chain.
Manufacturing disruptions can occur for many reasons including regulatory ac-
tion, production quality deviations or safety issues, labor disputes, site-specific
1http://www.investor.jnj.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=200406-16-71&CIK=200406
2“US FDA changes policy on switching hard gel capsule suppliers” by Gareth MacDonald
for in-Pharma Technologist, 16-Aug-2016, http://www.in-pharmatechnologist.com/Drug-Delivery/
US-FDA-changes-policy-on-switching-hard-gel-capsule-suppliers.
3http://www.investor.jnj.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=200406-17-6&CIK=200406
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incidents (such as fires), natural disasters, raw material shortages, political un-
rest and terrorist attacks. Such delays and difficulties in manufacturing can
result in product shortages, declines in sales and reputational impact as well as
significant remediation and related costs associated with addressing the short-
age.
More generally, companies are afraid of the risks which their trading partners run. While
many of them are impossible to eliminate either by the initiative of the given company or
simply in short-term period, a company might switch its attention to manageable risks. One
of them will be a default risk which is regulated by company’s capital structure decisions.
The higher company’s leverage is — given its size, growth opportunity, economic perfor-
mance, etc. — the more risky this company is considered to be by an outsider (including
a potential supplier or a potential customer). This paper is going to explore how firms
embedded in a product market network employ leverage as a commitment mechanism.
I study the influence of the structure of the network, the position of a company in the
network, and various company’s characteristics on its capital structure decision. Publicly
traded US companies are nodes or vertices of the network. The edges connecting the nodes
are of four types: competitive rivalry, partnership agreements, and customer and supplier
trading links. Two companies are neighbours in the corresponding network if at least one
of them mentions the connection between them in its public reports. The structure of the
network defines whether a company takes into consideration its neighbours’ leverage ratios
explicitly while making a capital structure decision. The position of a firm can vary from
core to peripheral. The core nodes are better incorporated in the network. The peripheral
nodes are relatively more isolated and if removed from the network, will not disturb its
structure much.
3.1.2 Literature and Hypotheses
Even though classical works on capital structure (Mogdiliani and Miller, 1958, Myers, 1984,
Frank and Goyal, 2009) ignore firm interactions, there are models showing that the inter-
firm relations matter for different financial aspects (Herskovic, 2017, Dai, Ng and Zaiats,
2017). More generally, there are three well-established strands of literature that relate to
this paper. The first one explores how the competition in a product market affects leverage.
The second strand examines the trading links along a supply chain and under vertical
integration. The third domain is less homogeneous; it studies networks in their different
aspects: social, trading, bank inter-lending, etc.
Product market competition. The seminal theoretical paper of Brander and Lewis
(1986) gave a rise to an entire new branch of research: capital structure in a product
market competition. Their prediction is that taking more leverage incites more aggressive
competitive behaviour from the companies, which encourages firms to use more leverage.
Zhdanov (2008) finds a set-up in which “follower” firms copy the “incumbent” agents and
have relatively higher leverage which brings them to their earlier default. Using network
terms, I define the “follower” firms as peripheral nodes, because they are the last to join
the network and have not had enough time to form as many edges as the core “incumbent”
companies. Thus, I expect them to copy capital structure decisions of core companies.
Leary and Roberts (2011) confirm this theoretical insight. However, they identify the
competitors through one- to three- digit SIC codes. Hobert and Phillips (2011) raise their
concern about the accuracy of the classic SIC and NAICS typologies. They reconstruct
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the connections between firms using textual analysis of the product description in 10-K
statements filed yearly with the Securities and Exchange Commission. I use the information
from the same reports concerning specifically competitors. That is, while aforementioned
methodology reconstructs the competitors, I use the companies that have been named the
competitors explicitly.
Hypothesis 1 On the competitor level, peripheral companies copy the behaviour of more
central ones, have higher leverage.
Supplier-customer leverage. The literature on upstream-downstream connections is
extensive as well. There is a lot of evidence in favour of debt being used as a bargaining tool
in customer-supplier negotiations. Kale and Shahrur (2007) find a positive relation between
a firm’s debt and the concentration rate of its customer or supplier industry. Chu and Wang
(2014) claim that the positive relation between the company’s and its customer’s leverage
is stronger when the customer industry concentration is higher. Jochem and Peters (2016)
confirm the direction of influence as they study how optimism in terms of EPS forecast
spreads from the managers of customer companies to the managers of their suppliers. They
find the short-term waves of optimistic forecast in leverage as well. This might be partly
explained by the finding of Hertzel et al. (2008): distress of a customer creates a significant
negative price shock on the suppliers and thus, creates negative wealth effect. However,
they do not investigate leverage in detail.
Hypothesis 2 The capital structure decisions spread from customer to supplier.
Chu (2012) studies the opposite direction from a theoretical point of view. He explores
how a customer’s leverage depends on suppliers’ bargaining power, expressed through the
elasticity of substitution between suppliers.
Charoenwong (2016) finds that the proximity of a company in a processing chain to the
final consumer matters for the level of leverage. It tends to increase closer to the consumer.
Hypothesis 3 Upstream and downstream positions matter but do not eliminate the influ-
ence of the centrality measure.
Networks. There are two relatively recent strands of literature that emerged in parallel:
social and production networks. Among numerous papers on the influence of social networks
of top managers and members of director boards on financial policies of the companies,
Gygax et al. (2017) find that the companies with the same directors tend to take similar
capital structure decisions. However, this aspect of networks is not going to be the focus of
this paper.
Production networks literature studies the complexity of production processes which
varies not only across industries but often across competing companies. Some of them
can involve hundreds of suppliers, some can buy inputs from only dozens. The specificity
of the product defines how easily a company can switch between suppliers and thus how
independent of the exact shipping agreements it can be. The levels at which companies
interact are manifold: they can not only directly provide supplies but also license out their
technologies, outsource jobs, and so on.
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Acemoglu et al. (2012) study how the structure of trading networks on an industry level
affects the profitability of the industries and find that core companies show better economic
performance. However, there is a lack of research on how the market product networks
affect leverage.
Another branch of network literature concerns bank inter-lending. Gornall and Stre-
bulaev (2017) develop a theoretical model which shows that banks have higher leverage
compared to industrial firms. The reason is banks’ low asset volatility and their supply
chain position. The potential to take high leverage makes them ideal intermediaries.
Hypothesis 4 In product market network core industries have higher leverage.
The last domain of network literature covers graph theory.
Galeotti et al. (2010) construct a model under realistic conditions of incomplete infor-
mation — every node is aware only of the part of the network. Their paper shows that
network nodes can perform several roles: depending on the network structure and their
positions in the network, the vertices can undertake substituting or complementing actions.
Applied to the problem of capital structure decision, the model takes a form of a network
economy where companies (nodes) issue debt (carry out actions). The substituting nature
of actions implies that when a company increases its debt, its trading partners (network
neighbours) shrink theirs. This is an example of using leverage as a commitment tool. It
happens when companies balance their risks very carefully. A set of risks is one of the
individual firm’s characteristics. There are plenty of risks a firm is subjected to: production
risks, delivery risk, regulatory risks, currency risk, default risk, and so on. Once one of them
surges, risk managers try to offset it, rebalance and reduce the rest of risk portfolio. So if
a trading partner of a firm suddenly increases its own leverage — the counterparty risk of
the firm-in-question rises automatically — the reaction of the firm’s risk management team
is to outbalance the new risk. If a model limits a set of the firm’s actions to increasing or
decreasing debt, the natural reaction is to diminish firm’s leverage.
In contrast, when the nature of the actions is complementary, the firm raises its leverage
in response to the increase of its neighbouring node’s leverage. This comovement is moti-
vated by a bargaining process. The trading partners might increase their leverage in order
to receive negotiate better deal conditions for itself.
Kale and Shahrur (2007) found that firms use leverage as a bargaining tool in supplier-
customer pairs. My insight is that network structure of connections can reveal an alternative
nature of leverage.
Hypothesis 5 Firms use leverage as a commitment device to encourage their counterparts
to enter firm specific relation.
Relation between partner firms is not as explicit as other types of connections. There is
no evident upstream-downstream “subordination” like in supply chain, no easily identifiable
rivalry like between competitors in a product market. Partner networks can rather be viewed
as a part of vertical integration research phenomenon, i.e., a mild form of supplier-customer
relations.
Hypothesis 6 Partner networks are a part of vertical integration relation.
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3.2 Sample
3.2.1 Data
The data come from two main sources: CRSP-Compustat dataset for firm fundamental
characteristics and Factset Revere for connections between firms.
Individual firm characteristics. Individual firms characteristics come from CRSP-
Compustat Annual Fundamentals dataset. The utilities, the firms with historical SIC or
SIC codes between 6000 and 6999, and financials, with historical SIC or SIC between 4900
and 4949, are not in the sample. The sample describes the publicly traded companies in-
corporated and headquartered in the USA and traded in US dollars. I impose several filters
on the data to fix the recording errors and balance the sample, eliminating firms with time
gaps in their time-series, with total assets and total debt negative or missing, with miss-
ing information on tangible assets, or with the sales which fell at least once below $10mln
within the observation period. I do not restrict the stock exchange where the shares are
traded. Monetary variables are discounted to 1990 and winsorised at 1%. Profitability and
stock returns are winsorised at 2%. The detailed description of the variables is presented
in Table A1, summary statistics are in Table 3.1 and in Figures 3.1 and 3.5 – 3.8.
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Figure 3.1: Histograms of Leverage Measures and Explanatory Variables. Individual
Firms Characteristics come form CRSP-Compustat Annual Fundamentals dataset. The sample
consists of publicly traded US firms. Monetary variables are discounted to 1990. All variables are
winsorised at 1% and 99%, except for Profitability and Stock Return which are winsorised at 2%
and 98%.
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(a) Zoom Out (b) Zoom In
Figure 3.2: Competitor Network in 2007. The figure presents an example of competitor
network. Only the links active in 2007 are shown. The size of the nodes indicates the degree of a
vertex — the number of neighbours — and the colour indicates modularity.
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Figure 3.3: Dynamics of Suppliers and Competitor Networks’ Centrality Measures. The
figure reports the dynamics of two pairs of centrality measures along the time axis. Panel 3.3a shows
the dynamics of in-degree centrality measure for supply chain (dash-line) network and competitor
(solid line) network. Panel 3.3b shows the dynamics of out-degree centrality measure for supply
chain (dash-line) network and competitor (solid line) network.
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Figure 3.4: Dynamics of average Market Leverage, Market Leverage Deficit, and Book
Leverage across the economy split with respect to In-degree and Eigen centrality mea-
sures. Competitor Network. The core industries are defined as a top quartile with respect to a
centrality measure. The peripheral industries correspond to the bottom quartile.
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Figure 3.5: Dynamics of average market leverage across the economy split with respect
to centrality measures. For all measures, except component number and string component
number, the core industries are defined as a top quartile with respect to a centrality measure. The
peripheral industries correspond to the bottom quartile. Due to the particularities of the definition,
strong component number has thresholds at 99% and 1%. For component number, its maximum
(co = 10) defines the core companies and the minimum (co = 0) defines the peripheral ones. Panels
(3.5a) – (3.5c) report the distributions of the measures based on the number of edges incoming,
outgoing, or passing via a vertex. Panels (3.5o) and (3.5l) show the distributions computed using
eigenvectors. Panels (3.5h) and (3.5i) describe the distributions of a dual measure.
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Figure 3.6: Dynamics of average book leverage across the economy split with respect to
centrality measures. For all measures, except component number and string component number,
the core industries are defined as a top quartile with respect to a centrality measure. The peripheral
industries correspond to the bottom quartile. Due to the particularities of the definition, strong
component number has thresholds at 99% and 1%. For component number, its maximum (co = 10)
defines the core companies and the minimum (co = 0) defines the peripheral ones. Panels (3.6a) –
(3.6c) report the distributions of the measures based on the number of edges incoming, outgoing, or
passing via a vertex. Panels (3.6o) and (3.6l) show the distributions computed using eigenvectors.
Panels (3.6h) and (3.6i) describe the distributions of a dual measure.
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Figure 3.7: Dynamics of average market leverage deficit across the economy split with
respect to centrality measures. For all measures, except component number and string compo-
nent number, the core industries are defined as a top quartile with respect to a centrality measure.
The peripheral industries correspond to the bottom quartile. Due to the particularities of the defini-
tion, strong component number has thresholds at 99% and 1%. For component number, its maximum
(co = 10) defines the core companies and the minimum (co = 0) defines the peripheral ones. Panels
(3.7a) – (3.7c) report the distributions of the measures based on the number of edges incoming,
outgoing, or passing via a vertex. Panels (3.7o) and (3.7l) show the distributions computed using
eigenvectors. Panels (3.7h) and (3.7i) describe the distributions of a dual measure.
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Figure 3.8: Dynamics of average profitability across the economy split with respect to
centrality measures. For all measures, except component number and string component number,
the core industries are defined as a top quartile with respect to a centrality measure. The peripheral
industries correspond to the bottom quartile. Due to the particularities of the definition, strong
component number has thresholds at 99% and 1%. For component number, its maximum (co = 10)
defines the core companies and the minimum (co = 0) defines the peripheral ones. Panels (3.8a) –
(3.8c) report the distributions of the measures based on the number of edges incoming, outgoing, or
passing via a vertex. Panels (3.8o) and (3.8l) show the distributions computed using eigenvectors.
Panels (3.8h) and (3.8i) describe the distributions of a dual measure.
Connections between firms. The data on connections between firms come from the
Factset Revere database. It comprises a list of source and target firm pairs with details
of the relationship. The source company is the one which provides information in its SEC
10-K annual filings, press releases, presentations, and so on. The target firm is the company
mentioned in those sources as a counterpart. The use of word “target” does not narrow down
the nature of relationship between the mentioned companies. This relation can be of four
major types: customers, suppliers, competitors, and partners. Each of the big categories in
turn consists of subtypes. Customers include firms that have been disclosed as customers
or entities to which the source company out-licenses technologies, patents, etc. and receives
payment in return. Suppliers are the disclosed suppliers, entities from which the source
company licenses technologies, patents, and so on, distributors, entities which promote or
manufacture the source company product or service. Competitor is an entity which the
source company mentioned as a competitor. Finally, partner category includes a number of
cases: entities which own a stake in the source company or in which the source company
has its stake, which own jointly with the source company a stake in a third entity. Partner
category also covers the cases of joint research, manufacturing, and unspecified partnership.
To merge the data from the two databases I use CUSIP identifiers and match the Factset
Revere contract dates with the report date from CRSP-Compustat.
In the next section I introduce centrality measures used in the paper. I discuss the final
sample in detail in Section 3.2.3.
3.2.2 Centrality Measures
Network theory produced numerous measures which can gauge the importance of a vertex
in the network. The quantity of these measures can be explained by different aspects of
importance: how many neighbours a vertex has, how critical its position is to maintain the
current structure of the network, how influential its status is, and so on. Every aspect can
be differentiated from a technical, computational point of view as well. Some measures are
calculated as a number of edges connecting the vertex with its neighbours, some involve
consideration of paths with different characteristics passing through the given vertex, some
are based on matrix computations. Below I cover the measures used in the paper.
Degree. In-degree is the number of incoming edges — the number of suppliers in economic
terms. Out-degree is the number of outgoing edges — the number of customers. Degree
is the total number of incoming and outgoing edges — the total number of suppliers and
customers.
Betweenness Centrality. Betweenness Centrality is the number of shortest paths be-
tween every two vertices in the network going through the given node.
Closeness Centrality. Closeness Centrality is the ratio of one over the sum of lengths
of the shortest paths between the given node and all other vertices of the network.
Harmonic Closeness Centrality. Harmonic Closeness Centrality is the sum over all
vertices of the network of the ratios of one over the length of the shortest path between the
given node and a corresponding vertex.
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Eigen Centrality. Eigen Centrality is the measure of influence of a node on the network
described by the respective entry of the eigenvector corresponding to the greatest eigenvalue.
Pagerank. Pagerank is measured by left-hand side eigenvector and scaled by the number
of the immediate neighbours.
Katz-Bonacich Centrality. Katz-Bonacich Centrality is similar to Eigen Centrality but
penalises remote connections with a “fee” α.
Authority and Hub Scores. The authority score of a vertex is proportional to the sum
of the hub scores of the vertices on the incoming ties and the hub score is proportional to
the authority scores of the vertices on the outgoing ties.
Eccentricity. Eccentricity is the maximum distance between the given node and any
other vertex of the network.
Modularity. Modularity is the difference between the ratio of the actual edges of the
group and the expected ratio if the connections were assigned randomly.
Component Number. Component Number in an undirected network is the number of
nodes in the greatest set of nodes such that every pair of them is connected by a path.4
Strong Component Number. Strong Component Number in a directed network is the
number of nodes in the greatest set of nodes such that every pair of them is connected by
a path.
Clustering. Clustering is the ratio of actual connected pairs of the given node’s neigh-
bours over all possible connected pairs of the given node’s neighbours.
3.2.3 The final sample
Below I continue the discussion started in Section 3.2.1. The final sample covers the period
of 2003–2015, as the earliest contract description available dates back to April 3, 2003. The
sample includes 1’657 unique firms and 387’043 observations. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 contain
summary statistics of the data. Table 3.4 lists core firms according to different definitions
of centrality.
4https://www.sci.unich.it/~francesc/teaching/network/components.html
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Leverage and Control Variables. The sample
consists of firms from the merged CRSP-Compustat database for companies with headquar-
ters in the USA from 2003 to 2014 on the annual base. Financials (historical SIC or SIC
between 4900 and 4949), utilities (historical SIC or SIC codes between 6000 and 6999), and
government entities (NAICS starts with letters) are excluded from the sample. All variables
are winsorised at 1% and 99%. Values are shown to three significant decimal places.
Centrality Measure Mean Median s.d. Min Max
Firm Size (log of sales) 6.552 6.518 1.744 2.310 12.62
Market-to-Book 1.248 0.968 1.078 0.00630 16.61
Profitability 0.125 0.125 0.0872 -0.314 0.347
Tangibility 0.281 0.207 0.230 0.0000754 0.983
Industry Concentration 0.0163 0.00933 0.0218 0.00129 0.249
Book Leverage 0.249 0.219 0.206 0.00000207 3.151
Market Leverage 0.221 0.173 0.195 0.00000133 0.991
Market Leverage Deficit -0.00531 -0.0279 0.153 -0.519 0.889
Stock Return 0.131 0.0548 0.571 -0.902 4.961
Quarterly CF Volatility 0.0143 0.00946 0.0175 0.000704 0.351
Observations 13219
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for Centrality Measures. Centrality measures are
computed on the base of the Factset Revere database. It provides information on suppliers
and customers that contribute at least 10% of consolidated revenue in any period reported.
Centrality Measure N Mean s.d. Min Max
indegree
Supply Chain, Dynamic 18869 20.39 47.70 0 600
Supply Chain 18742 20.34 47.62 0 599
Competitor, Dynamic 16850 4.789 11.68 0 195
Competitor 18866 12.53 29.12 0 394
Partner, Dynamic 14369 7.104 27.32 0 514
Partner 13031 7.722 28.47 0 511
Table 3.3: Centrality Percentiles. Centrality measures are computed on the base of the
Factset Revere database. It provides information on suppliers and customers that contribute
at least 10% of consolidated revenue in any period reported.
Centrality Measure p1 p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99
indegree
Supply Chain, Dynamic 0 0 1 3 7 18 43 71 275
Supply Chain 0 0 1 3 7 18 42 71 275
Competitor, Dynamic 0 0 0 1 2 5 10 17 57
Competitor 0 0 1 2 6 12 25 41 136
Partner, Dynamic 0 0 0 1 2 4 11 26 109
Partner 0 0 0 1 2 5 12 29 109
eigen centrality
Supply Chain, Dynamic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.011 0.058 0.170 0.271 0.614
Supply Chain 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.026 0.071 0.178 0.268 0.596
Competitor, Dynamic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.017 0.056 0.111 0.370
Competitor 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.010 0.029 0.080 0.129 0.456
Partner, Dynamic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.037 0.090 0.425
Partner 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.036 0.087 0.279
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There are two types of contracts: of a fixed duration and without an expiration date.
The average duration of supply contracts for one-time contracts is 907 days (or 2.5 years),
for repeated contracts — 810 days (or 2 years and 2.5 months). The average for the total
duration of contract links (in one long contract or in multiple short contracts) is 2190 days
(or 6 years). The average number of contracts per pair is 2, the maximum is 17.
The dataset can be well-characterised by looking at the reciprocity of the connections.
20’736 pairs of firms report each other as counteragents (source and target companies’ IDs
and start and end dates of the contract correspond). However, different parties report the
same contracts differently. In other words, there are not twice as few relations as repeated
pairs (10’368 pairs). Among them: 5’524 firms (2’762 pairs) claim each as competitors, 567
agree on the customer-supplier connection. There are 1’237 pairs where one of the parties
considers the other a competitor and the second claims to be customer (224 cases), supplier
(209 cases), or partner (the rest). 108 companies are customers of one another, 134 are
suppliers of one another.
Some companies register the same ties under several labels, for example, Nintendo Co
Ltd reports Interplay Entertainment Corp as a competitor during the period April 3–13,
2003, while Interplay Entertainment Corp reports Nintendo Co Ltd as a competitor, sup-
plier, and licensing partner. I do not correct or reconstruct the asymmetry of reported
links.
It is important to remember that the dataset is unbalanced. For example, a contract
is mentioned in a year when it contributes 10% and more to consolidated revenue of a
company and it is registered as a long-term agreement. Its contribution can change, or/and
the two firms can decide to end the contract for the following reasons: due to unexpected
new charges in the contract5, new regulation,6 or natural disasters and their consequences.7
Dynamics of centrality measures through the years are presented in Figure 3.3. The
average number of suppliers increases over the years. It is important to remember of the
10% compulsory reporting threshold, as it can affect the interpretation of this increase.
This effect could be explained by the fact that the firms chose to be more transparent with
time, or by the fluctuations in sales, the suppliers can trespass the contribution threshold
of 10%, and thus appear or disappear as a component of the graph.
It is worth noting that the network of connections can be quite volatile — in terms
of links between two particular companies rather than on average. For example, John-
son&Johnson report having a wholesaler distributing their products for all three segments
that represented approximately 11.0% of the total consolidated revenues in 2014. However,
in 2013 and 2012, they did not have a customer that represented 10% or more of total
consolidated revenues.8 The threshold of 10% can be easily overcome in either direction
due to potential shocks of various nature.
Nowadays regulators scrutinise reporting standards to promote responsible business ba-
haviour. The European Union have approved draft regulations which prohibit sourcing
minerals from conflict areas like Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi.
The planned date of introduction of these regulations is 2021. Although in the United
States such regulations and their approval are suspended — to a large extent because of
5http://www.msn.com/en-us/money/companies/wal-mart-to-impose-charges-on-suppliers-as-its-
costs-mount/ar-AAc0XCt
6http://www.reuters.com/article/us-tin-supply-chain-idUSKBN17N0DJ
7Toyata reorganised its supply chain in “earthquake resistant” way. They did not manage to exclude all
suppliers situated in risky locations but even if a disaster hits, the supply chain must recover within two
weeks. http://www.reuters.com/article/toyota-supply-chain-idUSL4E8E21ZJ20120302
8http://www.investor.jnj.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=200406-15-4&CIK=200406
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the recent presidential campaign and the new political course for cutting business costs —
companies which decide to be transparent and responsible appear to be more frequent.9
This behaviour does not have to be driven by sentiment or by purely brand building prac-
tice. Partly, it is a protection against future demand shocks.10 Final consumers do not
usually trace how a product has been produced. Nevertheless, when the information which
is not congruent with their ethical norms about their retailers is released, they fleed. In
the past 5 years, the supply scandals happened to a number of clothes chains: Marks &
Spencer, H&M, Uniqlo, Zara, and Nike were allegedly using child labour in South-East Asia
and South America11 ; and in food retailer industry: horsemeat sold as beef was found in
the UK supermarkets.
These shocks are not long-term, however, they have affected transparency policies of all
the above companies.
3.3 Testing the hypotheses
3.3.1 Target Leverage
Before testing the hypotheses, I compute target level of leverage. I exploit the list of classical
determinants (Frank, Goyal, 2009):
yt = α+X
target
t−1 β + Industry FE + t, (3.1)
where yt is market leverage and Xt−1 includes a classical set of firm-specific characteristics,
which will be discussed in detail below, and industry fixed effects.  is the error vector, and
(α′, β′) is the vector of parameters. I apply the Fama-MacBeth procedure to estimate the
equation. I run regressions year-by-year on the period 1990-2014; there are 1’467 – 1’921
firm-observation per year and 36’145 observation in total. Then I find the average for every
coefficient. The standard errors are computed by definition. R-squared is an average of
yearly Rs-squared. Table 3.5 reports the results of the regression. All the coefficients are
significant except for Abnormal earnings. The R-squared is 0.38. There are 49 industries
defined according to Fama and French.
Following numerous works in capital structure determinants (Titman and Wessels, 1988,
Frank and Goyal 2009, Johnson 2003) I pick a set of explanatory variables. I use natural
logarithm of sales as a proxy for company’s size. The logarithmic transformation assigns
higher weight to smaller firms. The coefficient, corresponding to it, is positive which can
be interpreted as: the larger firms can afford to raise more leverage, as they tend to be less
prone to default — because of business diversification or being more mature and having
more stable earnings (I control for the volatility of cash flows separately). Market-to-
book ratio is a proxy to growth opportunities; the corresponding coefficient is negative, as
expected, as the opportunities for growth increase the market value of capital but cannot be
collateralised. In other words, an increase in growth opportunities affects the denominator
of the leverage ratio in a positive way and the numerator stays mostly unaffected. An
interproduct of Market-to-Book ratio and Maturity has a positive coefficient. That is,
given the growth opportunities, having lower makes a company more likely to increase the
9Top management and owners of Chopard visit golden mines, which supply the metal to their production
units.
10http://www.reuters.com/article/us-tin-supply-chain-idUSKBN17N0DJ
11https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/supply-chain-transparency-relationships
-suppliers
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Table 3.5: Target Leverage. The table reports the results for the yearly regressions
of Market Leverage onto a classical set of explanatory variables. Signs of the coefficients
correspond to the trade-off theory prediction. The residuals of this regression are used in
the paper to denote Market Leverage Deficit. Industry fixed effects are included.
Variable Coef s.d.
Market-to-Bookt−1 -0.082 ∗∗∗ 0.005
Market-to-Book × Maturityt−1 0.001 ∗∗∗ 0.000
Tangibilityt−1 0.104 ∗∗∗ 0.009
Profitabilityt−1 -0.127 ∗∗∗ 0.027
Salest−1 0.004 ∗∗∗ 0.001
R&D ratiot−1 -0.235 ∗∗∗ 0.052
CF Volatilityt−1 -0.092 0.061
Investment Tax Creditt−1 -0.048 ∗∗∗ 0.008
Net Operational Loss Carryforwardt−1 0.045 ∗∗∗ 0.003
Abnormal Earningst−1 0.001 0.007
Observations 36’145
R-Squared 0.38
leverage ratio in the next period. Tangibility is a proxy for collateral; the higher it is, the
more leverage a company can take. Profitability has a negative coefficient: the operating
income increases the market value of the company but does not encourage it to issue more
debt. This coefficient is consistent with the pecking order theory by Donaldson (1961).
R&D ratio, which is the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets, reflects the uniqueness
of the firm. As it has been shown by Titman and Wessels (1988), R&D ratio is negatively
correlated with non-debt tax shields and with collateral value, so the negative coefficient in
the regression for Market Leverage is expected. The volatility of Operating Income Before
Depreciation must have a negative effect on the leverage ratio, since the less predictable
the cash flows are, the lower leverage a company can afford without exposing itself to high
default risks. Investment Tax Credit is the amount that a firm can legally subtract from
their tax payments due to reinvestment. I use it as a proxy for non-debt tax shield. The
negative coefficient can be interpreted as follows: the higher non-debt tax shield, the lower
the necessity of debt tax shield, hence, no need to issue more debt. Net Operating Loss
Carryforward is a dummy for non-zero Tax Loss Carry Forward. It corresponds positively
to the leverage: if a company suffers losses and plans to reduce tax liability in the next
period, the company is likely to increase its leverage. The coefficient corresponding to
Abnormal Earnings is not significant. The detailed definitions of the variables can be found
in Table A1.
I consider the Market Leverage predicted by the model (Market Leverage Fitted) an
“optimal”, target, level. The residuals of this regression stand for deviation of actual val-
ues from the “optimal” capital structure and form Market Leverage Deficit variable. The
existence of a target level for leverage is both widely supported (Titman and Tsyplakov,
2004, Leary and Roberts, 2005) and criticised (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999, Graham
and Harvey, 2001, Chang and Dasgupta, 2009). However, it has not been rejected by its
opponents entirely. It is the well-established fact that capital structure levels stay quite sta-
ble over decades (Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender, 2008). In this paper I attempt to explain
the time-varying deviation from this level with properties of inter-firm connections.
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3.3.2 Competitor Network
The literature on intra-industry capital structure is extensive and the exploration of com-
petitor network is not the main focus of this paper. I use it to test representativeness
of the new dataset. To do so, I verify the well-established hypothesis according to which
peripheral companies tend to have higher leverage. This idea has been explored by Zh-
danov (2008). Leary and Roberts (2011) have confirmed empirically it using the standard
CRSP-Compustat data and SIC codes to define the competitors.
I consider peripheral companies as “new comers” or “followers” in terms of product
market competition terminology. They are the last to enter the market and they have not
had enough time to form multiple connections: to gain a status of competitor by their rivals.
Statistically, these companies are younger firms with lower expertise (R&D expenditures).
That is to say, they lack experience and knowledge to make an educated capital structure
decision. Considering that, the peripheral firms choose to copy observable decisions of more
experienced and successful “incumbents”, or core firms.
The novelty of the result originates from the usage of the dataset where companies
name their competitors by themselves. This is the principal difference with the classical
approach, which defines whether firms compete or not by standard industry codes. Thus,
a large company has to choose a single industry code and “reject” an opportunity to be
classified as a competitor within its second, third, and so on largest sectors.
Example 1 Proctor and Gamble has SIC 2840. Leary and Roberts (2011) identified com-
petitors by three-digit SIC code. See Table 3.6 for the details. According to the tradi-
tional identification, P&G has 147 competitors, along the entire period of 2002-2015, from
3 sectors: SOAP, DETERGENTS, CLEANG PREPARATIONS, PERFUMES, COSMET-
ICS (SIC 2840); SPECIALTY CLEANING, POLISHING AND SANITATION PREPA-
RATIONS (SIC 2842); and PERFUMES, COSMETICS & OTHER TOILET PREPARA-
TIONS (SIC 2844). In its 10-K form annual report, P&G has identified 19 competitors and
has been identified 144 times by the firms from 21 industry, including ELECTRIC HOUSE-
WARES & FANS (SIC 3634). If we compare the companies which are present in both
lists the one formed according to SIC codes and the one collected from 10-K reports — , we
can see that the numbers of observations does not coincide. It means that the competition
might have been not essential in same years.
This example demonstrates that the traditional way of identifying competitors might
mention extra companies and omit real rivals. This particularity can lead to biased results.
To confirm that there is no “slicing” by SIC levels, I look at the network of the competitors
in, say, 2007. In Figure 3.2 we see no separate clouds, i.e., the competition strictly within
SIC or NAICS-codes industries, where the firms would have no chance to compete having
very different codes.
At the next step, I turn to examining the hypothesis 1 that peripheral firms should
have higher leverage. I pick two centrality measures, In-degree and Eigen Centrality, to
assign companies to core or peripheral groups. In-degree measure tells us how many firms
identify the given vertex as their competitor, which they see as a threat. In contrast,
Out-degree would be less appropriate here. The companies with the potentially higher
Out-degree — huge companies acting in several industries and expectedly behaving in a
more aggressive way — do not report long lists of their competitors. The second measure,
Eigen Centrality, gauges the overall importance of the node in the undirected network
of competitors. Figure 3.4 shows no clear support for the hypothesis and reports mixed
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Table 3.6: Comparison of three-digit SIC and Factset Revere links as identifica-
tion methods for competitors.
Three-digit SIC
Company Name SIC Frequency
CCA INDUSTRIES INC 2844 12
CHURCH & DWIGHT INC 2840 13
CLOROX CO/DE 2842 12
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE CO 2844 10
CPAC INC 2842 3
DEL LABORATORIES INC 2844 1
ECOLAB INC0 2842 10
ELIZABETH ARDEN INC 2844 10
LAUDER (ESTEE) COS IN 2844 12
STEPAN CO 2840 12
ZEP INC 2842 4
Total 3 codes 99
Factset Revere
Company Name SIC Frequency
ACUITY BRANDS INC 3640 1
AMGEN INC 2836 3
APPLICA INC 3634 1
CCA INDUSTRIES INC 2844 12
CHURCH & DWIGHT INC 2840 13
CLEARWATER PAPER CORP 2621 4
COFFEE HOLDING CO INC 5140 1
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE CO 2844 6
CPAC INC 2842 2
DEL LABORATORIES INC 2844 1
FARMER BROS CO 2090 2
HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP 2000 4
INTL FLAVORS & FRAGRA 2860 1
INVENTURE FOODS INC 2030 5
KIMBERLY-CLARK CORP 2621 1
LAUDER (ESTEE) COS IN 2844 12
LITTELFUSE INC 3613 1
MONDELEZ INTERNATIONA 2000 2
NUTRACEUTICAL INTL CO 2833 3
ORCHIDS PAPER PRODUCT 2670 1
PEPSICO INC 2080 5
PRESTIGE BRANDS HOLDI 5122 8
SALIX PHARMACEUTICALS 2834 2
SANTARUS INC 2834 2
ULTRALIFE CORP 3690 1
VIVUS INC 2834 5
WATER PIK TECHNOLOGIE 3569 2
YOUNG INNOVATIONS INC 3843 6
ZEP INC 2842 4
Total 21 codes 147
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evidence for either of the measures and for all three variables: Market Leverage, Market
Leverage Deficit, and Book Leverage.
To verify the hypothesis more accurately I run a regression:
yt = α+X
competitor
t−1 β + Industry FE + Y ear FE + t,
where y is the measure of capital structure and Xcompetitor is the firm’s characteristic matrix,
 is the error vector, and (α′, β′) is the vector of parameters. The results are reported in
Table 3.7. There is a panel for every leverage proxy: Market Leverage, Market Leverage
Deficit and Book Leverage. First three columns of the table show the coefficients for the
entire sample, columns (4) – (6) report the results for peripheral firms, with respect to the
corresponding measure, and finally, last three columns report estimates for core industries,
with respect to the same measure.
Market and Book Leverage have expected coefficients for the standard explanatory vari-
ables. They correspond in signs to what I have discussed in Section 3.3.1. Market Leverage
Deficit shows unusual in sign coefficients for size of a company and for Tangibility. This
happens because the main drivers are already offset.
As for the coefficients corresponding to the centrality measures, they are negative when
reported for the entire sample. This result confirms the hypothesis of a negative association
between centrality of a company and its leverage. The peripheral firms, in terms of the
In-degree and Eigen centrality, tend to be over-levered. The subsamples do not allow me
to infer which group of firms drives the effect.
3.3.3 Production Network
For the production network I show that more central firms demonstrate better economic
performance and lower leverage. The latter fact supports the hypothesis that companies
use leverage as a commitment device.
A proxy for economic performance is Return-on-Assets (Profitability). To study the
association with the centrality, I split the sample into three groups: core, intermediate, and
peripheral companies. Figure 3.8 demonstrates that the core firms — in terms of several
centrality measures — have prominent pattern of higher profitability over the span of 12
years. This supports the finding by Hertzel et al. (2008) and Acemoglu et al. (2012).
Figure 3.5 shows that core firms tend to have lower leverage, but very similar dynamics
to peripheral ones, driven mostly by the stock prices. To diminish this effect, I construct
similar graphs for Book Leverage. In Figure 3.6 the pattern is much more prominent. For
Market Leverage Deficit (Figure 3.7) the dynamics of core and peripheral firms are quite
different. To conduct a more accurate analysis, I run several regressions and estimate them
with different methods.
The specification for production network is as follows:
yt = α+X
supply chain
t−1 β + Industry FE + Y ear FE + t,
where y is the measure of capital structure and Xsupply chain is the firm’s characteristic
matrix,  is the error vector, and (α′, β′) is the vector of parameters. I include the industry
and the year fixed effects. The firm fixed effects and alternative specification of explanatory
factors are discussed in Section 3.3.5.
Firms characteristics include — besides standard Size, Profitability, Tangibility, and
Market-to-Book ratio — a proxy for bargaining power and a position in the supply chain.
For the bargaining power I use R&D ratio and control for it for both the firm-in-question and
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Table 3.7: Pooled regression. Competitor Network. Dependent variable heads the corresponding
panel: Market Leverage, Market Leverage Deficit, and Book Leverage. Columns (1) – (3) report the results
for the entire sample. Columns (4) – (6) do so for the subsample of peripheral firms. Columns (7) – (9)
show the coefficients for the subsample of core firms. The core industries are defined as a top quartile with
respect to a centrality measure. The peripheral industries correspond to the bottom quartile. The results
for In-degree and Eigen centrality measures are reported. Estimated by the ordinary least squares method.
Industry and year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses as follows: ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ stand for 5%,
1% and 0.1% significance levels, respectively.
Market Leverage
Entire Sample Peripheral Firms Core Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Firm Size (log of sales) 0.00536∗∗∗ 0.0114∗∗∗ 0.00939∗∗∗ 0.0221∗∗∗ 0.0232∗∗∗ 0.0233∗∗∗ -0.00714∗∗∗ -0.00552∗ -0.0126∗∗∗
(0.000921) (0.00117) (0.00112) (0.00288) (0.00247) (0.00297) (0.00128) (0.00234) (0.00216)
Market-to-Book -0.0776∗∗∗ -0.0734∗∗∗ -0.0732∗∗∗ -0.0652∗∗∗ -0.0738∗∗∗ -0.0652∗∗∗ -0.0845∗∗∗ -0.0668∗∗∗ -0.0735∗∗∗
(0.00163) (0.00166) (0.00167) (0.00342) (0.00299) (0.00342) (0.00281) (0.00259) (0.00286)
Profitability -0.120∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.0846∗ -0.0924∗∗ -0.0849∗ -0.0721∗ -0.177∗∗∗ -0.0459
(0.0151) (0.0156) (0.0157) (0.0343) (0.0287) (0.0343) (0.0288) (0.0296) (0.0324)
Tangibility 0.104∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.0989∗∗∗ 0.0894∗∗∗ 0.0996∗∗∗ 0.0711∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗
(0.00913) (0.00970) (0.00971) (0.0195) (0.0162) (0.0195) (0.0151) (0.0180) (0.0187)
In-Degree -0.00147∗∗∗ -0.00802 -0.000504∗∗∗
(0.000150) (0.00594) (0.000149)
Eigen Centrality -0.200∗∗∗ -9.996 -0.0425
(0.0246) (5.935) (0.0241)
Observations 12275 10838 10838 2730 3954 2730 4147 2809 2710
R2 0.337 0.346 0.344 0.357 0.349 0.358 0.381 0.456 0.442
Market Leverage Deficit
Entire Sample Peripheral Firms Core Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Firm Size (log of sales) -0.00157 0.00355∗∗ 0.00187 0.0147∗∗∗ 0.0157∗∗∗ 0.0159∗∗∗ -0.0134∗∗∗ -0.0115∗∗∗ -0.0172∗∗∗
(0.000884) (0.00112) (0.00107) (0.00274) (0.00235) (0.00283) (0.00126) (0.00230) (0.00215)
Market-to-Book -0.00362∗ 0.000427 0.000542 0.00980∗∗ 0.00185 0.00982∗∗ -0.00755∗∗ 0.00600∗ 0.00467
(0.00156) (0.00160) (0.00160) (0.00327) (0.00284) (0.00327) (0.00277) (0.00255) (0.00284)
Profitability -0.00351 -0.00245 -0.000396 -0.0277 -0.0316 -0.0280 0.0429 -0.0281 0.0605
(0.0145) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0327) (0.0273) (0.0327) (0.0283) (0.0292) (0.0322)
Tangibility -0.0429∗∗∗ -0.0285∗∗ -0.0286∗∗ -0.0406∗ -0.0503∗∗ -0.0399∗ -0.0746∗∗∗ 0.0708∗∗∗ 0.00437
(0.00876) (0.00931) (0.00932) (0.0186) (0.0154) (0.0186) (0.0148) (0.0178) (0.0186)
In-Degree -0.00123∗∗∗ -0.00955 -0.000316∗
(0.000144) (0.00565) (0.000147)
Eigen Centrality -0.166∗∗∗ -9.824 -0.0267
(0.0236) (5.662) (0.0239)
Observations 12275 10838 10838 2730 3954 2730 4147 2809 2710
R2 0.009 0.016 0.014 0.055 0.040 0.056 0.072 0.152 0.158
Book Leverage
Entire Sample Peripheral Firms Core Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Firm Size (log of sales) 0.00778∗∗∗ 0.0145∗∗∗ 0.0122∗∗∗ 0.0269∗∗∗ 0.0243∗∗∗ 0.0263∗∗∗ -0.00701∗∗∗ -0.0213∗∗∗ -0.0249∗∗∗
(0.00110) (0.00142) (0.00135) (0.00319) (0.00263) (0.00329) (0.00151) (0.00311) (0.00278)
Market-to-Book -0.0270∗∗∗ -0.0244∗∗∗ -0.0242∗∗∗ -0.0256∗∗∗ -0.0335∗∗∗ -0.0256∗∗∗ -0.0336∗∗∗ -0.0297∗∗∗ -0.0348∗∗∗
(0.00193) (0.00201) (0.00201) (0.00380) (0.00318) (0.00380) (0.00332) (0.00345) (0.00368)
Profitability 0.0522∗∗ 0.0588∗∗ 0.0618∗∗ 0.0406 0.0835∗∗ 0.0408 0.0871∗ 0.0270 0.202∗∗∗
(0.0180) (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0381) (0.0306) (0.0381) (0.0340) (0.0394) (0.0417)
Tangibility 0.0910∗∗∗ 0.0965∗∗∗ 0.0963∗∗∗ 0.0552∗ 0.0775∗∗∗ 0.0548∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
(0.0108) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0216) (0.0173) (0.0216) (0.0178) (0.0240) (0.0240)
In-Degree -0.00179∗∗∗ 0.00102 -0.000352
(0.000182) (0.00633) (0.000198)
Eigen Centrality -0.247∗∗∗ 5.175 -0.00497
(0.0297) (6.587) (0.0310)
Observations 12275 10838 10838 2730 3954 2730 4147 2809 2710
R2 0.157 0.168 0.166 0.239 0.231 0.239 0.183 0.265 0.262
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its counterparty. The regressions report (Tables 3.8 – 3.11) significant negative coefficients.
The effect is expected be driven by the correlation between R&D ratio and non-debt tax
credit, as it is discussed in Section 3.3.1. Controlling for the bargaining power of both sides
is essential in these regressions. This way I can address the issue of the switching costs and
of the uniqueness of a supplier or a customer.
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Following the logic of Charoenwong (2016), I split the sample into three groups according
to their proximity to the final consumer: downstream, midstream, and upstream firms. The
upstream are the ones who have no suppliers. The downstream are those who have no
business customers. We expect upstream firms to have less leverage. However, the results I
observe tend to be the opposite: all supply chain position coefficients are negative and the
coefficients corresponding to upstream firms are lower in magnitude. Thus, the leverage for
upstream firms is higher on average.
The Market Leverage is countercyclical to all centrality measures.12 It means that
whether a company has more trading partners (represented by In-degree, Out-degree, and
Degree), is situated in a more important network location (Authority and Hub), or is
considered more influential (Eigen Centrality), it will tend to have lower leverage. This
gives us an insight that leverage is used as a commitment device.
Panels for the core and peripheral firms show that for different centrality measures,
either core or peripheral companies could drive the effect.
To exploit the structure of the data in a more efficient way, I proceed with the Fama-
Macbeth procedure. Tables 3.12 – 3.13 show the result. I apply the same empirical model
as in pooled regression and the results stay unchanged.
12The centrality measures that are not reported here — closeness, harmonic closeness, betweenness, mod-
ularity, and component number – have not shown significant results.
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Further, I test the direction of the influence: to the previous setting I add a lagged
trading partner’s leverage. For the firms which have customers it will be a customer leverage.
For the firms which have suppliers I add supplier’s leverage. Table 3.14 shows significant
influence by the lagged leverage ratio of both a customer and a supplier. Thus, I cannot
exclude upstream or downstream directions of influence of capital structure policy spread.
Table 3.14: Market Leverage as a response to Customer/Supplier Market Lever-
age. The table reports the results of regressions with inclusion of two customer/supplier
characteristics: lagged leverage and R&D ratio. The columns with odd numbers correspond
to suppliers sample and their reaction to customers’ leverage and R&D. The columns with
even numbers correspond to customers sample and their reaction to suppliers’ leverage and
R&D. Industry fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses as follows: ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗
stand for 5%, 1% and 0.1% significance levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cust/Sup Market Leverage 0.664∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗ 0.663∗∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗
(0.0125) (0.0111) (0.0125) (0.0111) (0.0125) (0.0111) (0.0125) (0.0111)
Firm Size (log of sales) 0.00277∗∗ 0.00166 0.00845∗∗∗ 0.00736∗∗∗ 0.00311∗∗ 0.00197∗ 0.00776∗∗∗ 0.00659∗∗∗
(0.000934) (0.000918) (0.00115) (0.00112) (0.000954) (0.000937) (0.00113) (0.00110)
Market-to-Book -0.0468∗∗∗ -0.0453∗∗∗ -0.0467∗∗∗ -0.0451∗∗∗ -0.0469∗∗∗ -0.0454∗∗∗ -0.0469∗∗∗ -0.0453∗∗∗
(0.00169) (0.00166) (0.00169) (0.00166) (0.00169) (0.00166) (0.00169) (0.00166)
Profitability -0.0886∗∗∗ -0.0797∗∗∗ -0.0989∗∗∗ -0.0899∗∗∗ -0.0890∗∗∗ -0.0803∗∗∗ -0.0971∗∗∗ -0.0881∗∗∗
(0.0153) (0.0151) (0.0153) (0.0151) (0.0154) (0.0151) (0.0153) (0.0151)
Tangibility 0.0578∗∗∗ 0.0682∗∗∗ 0.0616∗∗∗ 0.0721∗∗∗ 0.0573∗∗∗ 0.0677∗∗∗ 0.0591∗∗∗ 0.0696∗∗∗
(0.00994) (0.00970) (0.00992) (0.00968) (0.00996) (0.00972) (0.00992) (0.00968)
Cust/Sup R&D ratio -0.337∗∗∗ -0.313∗∗∗ -0.324∗∗∗ -0.305∗∗∗ -0.332∗∗∗ -0.308∗∗∗ -0.318∗∗∗ -0.297∗∗∗
(0.0350) (0.0333) (0.0349) (0.0332) (0.0351) (0.0334) (0.0350) (0.0333)
R&D ratio 0.274∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗
(0.0364) (0.0406) (0.0363) (0.0405) (0.0364) (0.0407) (0.0363) (0.0405)
R&D * C/S R&D 0.196∗∗∗ 0.123∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.105∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.119∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.100
(0.0530) (0.0526) (0.0528) (0.0525) (0.0531) (0.0527) (0.0529) (0.0525)
In-Degree -0.000899∗∗∗ -0.000917∗∗∗
(0.000105) (0.000103)
Out-Degree -0.000351 -0.000327
(0.000184) (0.000181)
Degree -0.000679∗∗∗ -0.000683∗∗∗
(0.0000861) (0.0000843)
Observations 8606 8777 8595 8766 8595 8766 8595 8766
R2 0.520 0.531 0.524 0.535 0.520 0.531 0.523 0.534
3.3.4 Partner Firms’ Network
The partners relations are more similar in nature to supply chains than to a competition.
They are regulated by a formal agreement. The difference is that the regulation is not as
strict: delivery payments usually do not have to be made in advance and some types of
partnership do not have an immediate effect on company’s output.
Figure 3.9 show no clear evidence of higher or lower leverage for core or peripheral firms.
I introduce two alternative definitions of partnership, which are two sub-types of partners
set: partner-investors (with equity cross-holdings or joint investment into a third company)
and partner-manufacturers (joint production, research, licensing, etc.) and test the following
model with three different definitions of partners:
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Figure 3.9: Dynamics of average Market Leverage, Market Leverage Deficit, and Book
Leverage across the economy split with respect to In-degree and Eigen centrality mea-
sures. Partner Network. The core industries are defined as a top quartile with respect to a
centrality measure. The peripheral industries correspond to the bottom quartile.
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yt = α+X
partner
t−1 β + Industry FE + Y ear FE + t,
where y is the measure of capital structure and Xpartner is the firm’s characteristic matrix,
 is the error vector, and (α′, β′) is the vector of parameters. Tables 3.15 – 3.16 show
the results. The centrality measures which have significant coefficients both in production
and in partner networks keep their negative association. However, Closeness and Harmonic
Closeness which were insignificant in supply chain regressions have positive coefficients.
However, as it is the only two measures, which are similar in nature, balanced out by 6
other measures, I tend infer that partner network can be viewed as a mild form of the
production network and partner network has a particular structure. Some nodes can have
only a few links to the key vertices, i.e., a few connections with its own neighbours but
stay linked by shorts paths with the other nodes of the network. Under these conditions
some nodes would expose low In-degree, Out-degree, and Degree and high Closeness and
Harmonic Closeness.
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3.3.5 Robustness Checks
To verify the robustness of my results, I run all tests for 4 variables: Book, Gross Market,
and Net Market Leverage, and Market Leverage Deficit. I do not report all results, because
the coefficients for Book and Market Leverages are very similar in sign, magnitude, and
significance. Although I do not use panel estimations with random effects in the main
analysis, I employ it as a robustness check for panel estimations with fixed effects and the
Fama-MacBeth procedure estimations. I also run spatial regressions and even though the
spatial effect per se is not confirmed, the results support all my findings in competitor
and supply chain networks. The regressions with alternative proxies for bargaining power,
namely, industry Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index of sales and a yearly concentration of a
firm’s sales in the total industry sales show similar results.
Throughout the paper I do not include firm fixed effects into regressions. Firm fixed
effects increase R-squared by 40-60 p.p.. However, they do not add anything to the ex-
planatory power of the model. They do establish that fact that a firm is unique but do not
explain why.
3.4 Conclusion
In order to test my main hypothesis about the role of leverage as a commitment tool, I
verify the representativeness of my novel dataset. For the competitor network, I confirm
the result of Zhdanov (2008) and Leary and Roberts (2011): peripheral companies have
higher leverage (hypothesis 1). There is a significant influence of the lagged leverage ratio
of a customer on the leverage ratio of the supplier. However, supplier’s leverage affects
positively and significantly its customer’s leverage too (hypothesis 2). My results are robust
to inclusion of upstream and downstream positions dummies (hypothesis 3). In contrast to
Gonrall and Strebulaev (2017), core industries tend to have lower leverage (hypothesis 4 is
rejected). The leverage shows properties of a commitment device, as core industries tend
to have lower leverage. At the same time I repeat the result of Kale and Shahrur (2007),
showing that leverage is used as a bargaining tool: customer’s leverage positively associated
with supplier’s R&D expenditures (hypothesis 5 cannot be rejected). Partner network can
be interpreted as a mild form of supplier chain network (hypothesis 6).
One of the potential extensions to the present study is to increase the representativeness
of the network by combining the properties of the industry and firm level data and by
simulations. Another potential extension is to study sub-groups of relations: joint R&D or
cross stake holding for partners. For competitors, my minor finding encourages to follow
Hoberg and Phillips (2011) and explore the particularities of market competition on the
network-like grid.
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Chapter 4
Debt Type and Acquisitions
with Theodosios Dimopoulos1 and Stefano Sacchetto 2
In this paper, we study empirically how deviations from target debt maturity affect
acquisition decisions. We find that the probability of becoming an acquirer is positively
associated with the firm’s pre-acquisition deviation from target debt maturity. Moreover,
we examine the implications of debt maturity for bidder and target returns, and for target
selection. We also investigate the potential of several economic theories to explain the link
between debt maturity and acquisition policy.
4.1 Introduction
What is the effect of debt maturity on corporate acquisitions? While recent evidence by
Uysal (2011) and Harford, Klasa, and Walcott (2009) show that leverage affects the likeli-
hood that a firm becomes an acquirer and how it finances its bid, the relation between debt
maturity and acquisition policies remains unexplored. Answering this question allows us to
better understand which types of financing frictions drive corporate investment.
Several theories study the interaction between debt maturity and investment. Myers
(1977) suggests that short-term debt is a solution to the debt overhang problem.3 He
argues that, even if a firm has a positive net-present-value investment opportunity, share-
holders may not want to invest in it to avoid sharing the benefits with the debt holders
in the event of default. However, short term debt allows equity holders to exercise their
investment option after debt repayment, thus avoiding sharing the investment returns with
debt holders. Ceteris paribus, the probability that a firm engages in large investments,
such as acquisitions, should be negatively related to its debt maturity. Other theories argue
that long-term debt can be beneficial, since it avoids short-term refinancing costs. These
costs reflect debt holdup problems (Diamond (1991)), or transaction costs in debt rollover
(Titman and Tsyplakov (2007), Kuehn and Schmid (2014) and Poeschl (2017)). Hence,
ceteris paribus, firms with a longer debt maturity are more likely to engage in acquisitions.
In this chapter, we study empirically how deviations from target debt maturity affect
acquisition decisions. We find that the probability of becoming an acquirer is positively
associated with the firm’s pre-acquisition deviation from target debt maturity. Moreover,
1Swiss Finance Institute, and University of Lausanne
2IESE Business School, University of Navarra
3Compared to this classical result, Diamond and He (2014) present a dynamic model and show that,
depending on the timing of investment opportunities, short-term debt can generate a higher debt overhang
problem.
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we examine the implications of debt maturity for bidder and target returns, and for target
selection. We also investigate the potential of several economic theories to explain the link
between debt maturity and acquisition policy.
Since target levels of capital structure are unobservable, we employ a two-stage esti-
mation procedure to estimate the effects of deviations from target leverage and maturity
of debt. In the first stage, we use the simultaneous-equation system proposed by Johnson
(2003) to jointly determine leverage and debt maturity targets of firms. This step allows
capital structure targets to vary according to firm size, growth opportunities, profitability,
tangibility, cash flow volatility, asset maturity, investment tax credits and loss carryfor-
wards. In the second stage, we perform a probit regression of the probability of becoming
an acquirer on the leverage and debt maturity deficits obtained from the first stage, and
other controls. We perform our analysis on a large sample of mergers and acquisitions for
public U.S. companies using data from Compustat and SDC Platinum for the period 1991
to 2013.
The main finding of our paper is that a positive deviation from target debt maturity in a
period, i.e. a current ratio of long-term-debt to total debt higher than the predicted target,
is positively associated with the probability that a firm becomes an acquirer in the next
period. This effect is significantly both statistically and economically: moving from the
bottom to the top decile of maturity deficit increases the likelihood of becoming an acquirer
from 10% to 16%. This result reflects a positive effect of debt maturity on both asset- and
firm acquisitions. These results are consistent with theories of costly debt rollover (Titman
and Tsyplakov (2007), Kuehn and Schmid (2014) and Poeschl (2017)) and dynamic debt
overhang (Diamond and He (2014)), but not with static debt overhang (Myers (1977)).
Next, we investigate the potential of dynamic debt overhang to explain the link between
debt maturity and acquisition likelihood. Diamond and He (2014) provide a formal analysis
of the effect of debt maturity structure on real investment. They show that Myers’ (1977)
intuitive analysis, which suggests that debt overhang increases with debt maturity, does
deserve merit, but it also faces limitations. In their analysis, Diamond and He (2014)
highlight the importance of sequential investment opportunities. Firms invest in projects
not only because of the direct cash flows they generate, but also because of the future
investment projects that they bring.4 The argument of Diamond and He (2014) is that short-
term debt increases the likelihood of default and the risk that future investment projects
are lost. In turn, this means that short-term debt decreases the marginal profitability of
current investment and accentuates the debt overhang problem.
From an empirical perspective, the theory of Diamond and He (2014) implies that in
good times, i.e. when firms have high growth opportunities, short-term debt can hurt
investment more than long-term debt. Controlling for leverage, the deviation of long-
term debt from target, when interacted with proxies for growth opportunities, should yield
a positive effect on the likelihood that the firm is an acquirer. Using three proxies for
growth opportunities—the firm’s market-to-book ratio, the cash-flow-to-assets ratio, and
an indicator variable for years outside of recession—we do not find statistical evidence
in favor of the Diamond and He (2014) hypothesis. Thus, we conclude that the positive
association between debt maturity and acquisition likelihood does not lend support to either
the static or the dynamic debt overhang theory.
When we study the effects of debt maturity on value creation, we do not find any
4This consideration is especially important when considering investment in the form of acquisition expen-
diture, since Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) find that more than a third of all the large, nonfinancial,
nonutility takeovers are undertaken by serial acquirers.
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evidence that the maturity structure significantly affects the acquirer’s cumulative abnormal
returns (CARs) or the target premium. However, consistent with the idea that short-term
debt accentuates financing constraints, we find that deviations from maturity targets are
positively associated with the size of the target firms.5 Overall, we conclude that debt
maturity affects the total deal volume, but not the average deal quality.
The analysis in this chapter is most closely related to empirical studies that investigate
the dynamics of leverage around mergers and acquisitions. Uysal (2011) shows that devia-
tions from target leverage have a significant effect on the probability that a firm becomes
an acquirer: firms with leverage above target have a lower probability of becoming acquir-
ers and of using cash as a means of payment in their offers. Harford, Klasa, and Walcott
(2009) study how deviations from target leverage affect the means of financing in M&As,
finding that over-levered bidders are less likely to finance acquisitions with further debt.
Our contribution is to show that not only the level, but also the maturity of debt affects
firms’ acquisition decisions.
In general, this chapter contributes to the literature that examines deviations from cap-
ital structure targets and their implications on corporate financing and investment choices.
In particular, our study relates to Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), Fama and French
(2002), and Flannery and Rangan (2006), who focus on the effect of capital structure de-
viations from target for security issuance. Finally, our study also builds on the empirical
literature that studies the determinants of debt maturity choice (see, for example, Bar-
clay and Smith, 1995; Guedes and Opler, 1996; and Johnson, 2003) to define target debt
maturity at the firm level.
The chapter proceeds as follows, in the next section we describe our dataset, Section
4.3 explains how we construct target values for leverage and long-term debt. Section 4.4
covers our findings on the relation between long-term debt deficit and M&A activity. In
Section 4.5 we show how long-term deficit affects acquisition deal parameters and Section
4.6 concludes.
4.2 Data
Our sample covers 1988–2014 and is based on the dataset reported by CRSP-Compustat
database. Exact definitions of variables are provided in Section 5. To ensure consistency
with the existing research (Uysal (2011), Colla, Ippolito, and Li (2013)), we apply several
filters.
First, to maintain similar reporting standards, we keep only firms incorporated and
having headquarters in the USA, traded on Amex, Nasdaq, or NYSE in USD. This amounts
to 77,647 firm-year observations and 7,155 unique firms.
Second, we discard industries exposed to specific regulation: financials and utilitties, —
and at the same time clean the dataset of the observations with supposed errors in report-
ing. Eliminating financials and utilities, on the basis of historical and current SIC codes,
leaves 57,724 observations. We drop observations if total assets and total debt are missing,
negative, or zero. We eliminate observations if a company has zero tangible assets. We drop
firms if their sales are below $10 million, in 1990 dollars, at least once; which results in a
sample of 42,574 firm-year observations. Finally, we drop companies whose debt in current
liabilities (dlc) is less than debt due in the first year (dd1). Our sample consists of 42,570
observations.
5We also find that overlevered firms acquire smaller target companies, confirming the result in Uysal
(2011).
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We merge the resulting sample with a sample of takeovers, obtained from Thompson
Reuters SDC database. Our takeover information includes information on announcement
dates, information about acquiring and target firms, types of takeovers, and transaction
values. We apply several filters before merging the datasets. First, we only keep completed
takeovers. Second, following Uysal (2011), we keep deals for which the form reported in
SDC is “merger”, “acquisition of majority interest”, “asset acquisition”, or “acquisition of
certain assets”. Third, we keep only cases in which the acquirer seeks to buy more than
50% of the target, and owns more than 50% at completion. Finally, we eliminate deals in
which the target is bankrupt or there is a debt restructuring.
In the merged sample, the announcement date of a deal matches the latest closed firm-
year observation. The outcome is following: firms which have not participated in M&A
activities in a given year remain in the sample as a single firm-year observation. If a firm
has participated in a number of M&A activities, it is represented by the corresponding
number of firm-year observations with the same fundamental data and different data on
every M&A deal involved. We also assign takeovers into two subsamples: firm and asset
acquisitions. Firm acquisitions are the deals for which the form reported in SDC is “merger”
or “acquisition of majority interest”. Asset acquisitions include deals classified as “asset
acquisition” or “acquisition of certain assets”.
Thus, we are left with 49,176 observations or, as before, 42,570 unique firm-year obser-
vations. At this point we apply the last filter: we remove observations if a relative size of
the deal (a ratio of the value of the deal to the total assets of bidder) is less than 1% (47,959
observations, 42,142 unique firm-year pairs, 4,324 unique firms). It is worth noting that as
the source of fundamental information on firms is Compustat, a database covering publicly
traded companies only, we do not cover the statistics for private targets.
Table 4.1 reports the descriptive statistics for our sample. Panel A summarises the
fundamental characteristics of the sample. Average Total Assets are $2,312mln in 1990
dollars, varying from $1.606mln to $198’104mln. Market Leverage averages 23.6% and
varies from 0 to 99.2%. Market-to-Book ratio has an average of 1.804, a minimum of 0.291
and a maximum of 38.49. Profitability averages 0.125 and has extremes of −5.149 and 1.389.
Tangibility has an average of 0.312 over a unit interval. Sales have an average of 5.984, a
minimum of −1.911 and a maximum of 12.56. All the variables are winsorised at 1% and
99% levels, except Profitability which is winsorised at 2% and 98%. Overall, the statistics
for fundamentals are consistent with the literature (Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008)).
Panel B reports the statistics for M&A activity. 32.4% of firms interest our sample make
at least one acquisition. Most of them (25.3% of the whole sample) acquired assets and only
about 7% of the entire sample participated in Mergers and Majority interest acquisitions.
On average, firms make an acquisition per year; however, the majority of firms in the
sample have make no acquisitions and a few firms make up to 30 per year. This statistics
is consistent with the finding of Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) that the companies
who acquired five or more firms within a short period of time contribute more than a third
of large, nonfinancial, nonutility takeovers in the United States.
The relative size of target which is measured by the ratio of the deal transaction value
over the acquirer’s total assets has an average of 21%.
The relatively low rate of M&A activity and the large size of the targets is explained by
the fact that our sample does not include the information on private targets while in reality
the majority of the acquisitions involve private firms.
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics. Panel A reports the statistics for the sample of firms
from a merged CRSP-Compustat database for companies with headquarters in the USA
from 1991 to 2013 on the annual base. Financials (historical SIC or SIC between 4900 and
4949), utilities (historical SIC or SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) are excluded from the
sample. All variables are winsorised at 1% and 99%, except Stock Return which winsorised
at 2% and 98%. Values are shown to two decimal places.
Panel B: summarizes the statistics for the merged CRSP-Compustat and SDC dataset.
Panel A: Firm Characteristics
Variable Mean Median S.d. Minimum Maximum
Total Assets 3041.35 419.48 10319.78 1.61 198103.81
Market-to-Book 1.82 1.50 1.24 0.29 38.49
Profitability 0.13 0.13 0.11 -5.15 1.39
Tangibility 0.31 0.24 0.23 0.00 1.00
Sales 6.18 6.08 1.80 0.13 12.56
Asset Maturity 4.21 2.75 5.78 -15.20 633.77
Net Operating Loss Carryforward 0.65 1.00 0.48 0.00 1.00
CF Volatility 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 1.28
Abnormal Returns 0.03 0.00 2.03 -147.50 347.80
Investment Tax Credit 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.00 1.00
Market Leverage 0.23 0.18 0.21 0.00 0.99
Cost of Debt 0.11 0.07 0.25 0.00 4.96
Stock Return 0.17 0.02 1.57 -0.99 134.60
Observations 37500
Panel B: M&A Deals Characteristics
Variable Mean Median S.d. Minimum Maximum
Ratio of Acquirers 0.33 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00
Ratio of Asset Acquirers 0.26 0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00
Ratio of Firm Acquirers 0.07 0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00
Number of Acquisitions 0.97 0.00 2.27 0.00 30.00
Number of Asset Acquisitions 0.79 0.00 2.01 0.00 28.00
Number of Firm Acquisitions 0.18 0.00 0.59 0.00 10.00
Relative Size 0.20 0.06 0.45 0.00 9.48
All Cash 0.72 1.00 0.45 0.00 1.00
Competed 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00
Hostile 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00
Observations 37500
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4.3 Target Leverage and long-term debt
According to the trade-off theory of capital structure, there is an optimal level of leverage
which depends on company’s fundamental characteristics. Frank and Goyal (2009) elabo-
rate the list of these fundamentals, study which parameters have significant influence on the
leverage ratio and choose the main factors: market-to-book ratio, tangible assets, profitabil-
ity, etc. We use these factors as explanatory variables and interpret the predictions of this
empirical model as Target Market Leverage. If an actual value of firm’s Market Leverage
exceeds it, we call this firm over-levered. If the actual value of Market Leverage is lower,
then the firms are categorised as under-levered. Similar logic applies to the fraction of total
debt that is long-term. We define as long-term debt that is due more than three years from
the company’s reporting date.
Following Johnson (2003), we model the joint dynamics of Market Leverage and Long-
Term Debt by the system of simultaneous equations{
MLt = LTDt + βMLX
ML
t−1 + industry FE + εt,
LTDt = MLt + βLTDX
LTD
t−1 + industry FE + εt,
where MLt is a market leverage, LTDt is a percentage of long-term debt in total debt.
The set of explanatory variables for Market Leverage, XML, includes Market-to-Book ratio,
interproduct of Market-to-Book ratio and Assets Maturity, Tangibility of assets,Profitability,
logarithm of Sales, volatility of quarterly Cash Flows, Investment Tax Credit, Net Operating
Loss Carryforward and Abnormal Earnings. All variables are measured with one year lag.
The pool of the explanatory variables for the Long-Term Debt, XLTD, includes Market-
to-Book ratio, Assets Maturity, logarithm of Sales, squared logarithm of Sales, volatility
of quarterly Cash Flows, Investment Tax Credit, Net Operating Loss Carryforward and
Abnormal Earnings. All variables are measured with one year lag.
We use three-stage least squares estimation for systems of simultaneous equations.
Johnson (2003) addresses exclusion restrictions by handpicking some coefficients in the
system of equations. To guard against the possibility that the exclusion restrictions are
violated, we run a robustness check, in which targets for leverage and maturity are pinned
down by means of single equation Fama-MacBeth regressions. We run singles equations
year-by-year from 1991 to 2013 and then find an average of the year-by-year coefficients.
The results of the entire study hold under this alternative specification.
Table 4.2 reports the results of simultaneous equations regression. Significant coeffi-
cients meet our expectations. The increase in the percentage of Long-Term Debt leads to
the increase of Market Leverage, which is consistent with Johnson (2003). Growth opportu-
nities which we measure by Market-to-Book ratio relate negatively to the Market Leverage;
traditionally it is interpreted as growth opportunities increase firm market value but do not
affect the book debt of a company. An interproduct of growth opportunities with Asset
Maturity has a negative coefficient: between two companies with the same growth opportu-
nities the one with the lower Asset Maturity will have a higher leverage. Tangibility impact
is positive, firms having more tangible assets can provide collateral for their potential new
debt. Probability has a negative coefficient, as expected, this interaction is usually inter-
preted in a way that fastly growing operating income increases the market value of assets
and does not have direct influence on the magnitude of book debt. A negative relation
with the firm size means that smaller firms prefer to issue relatively more debt than big
firms do. It can happen due to the comparatively higher costs of equity issuing. Investment
Tax Credit and Net Operating Loss Carry-forward are proxies for non-debt tax shields. In-
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vestment Tax Credit takes value one when a firm gets a tax credit for reinvestment. Net
Operating Loss Carry-forward is a dummy for non-zero tax loss carry-forward. Both have
positive coefficients, which is surprising, as we expect alternative tax shields to reduce the
attractiveness of leverage. Abnormal Returns do not have a significant impact on either
leverage, or maturity.
The coefficient of Market Leverage over Long-term maturity is not significant. Contrary
to the predictions by Myers (1977) we find a positive association between firm’s growth
opportunity and long-term maturity. We will address the relation between the maturity
and acquisitions as a growth opportunity in Section 4.4.2. Both Sales and Sales squared are
in positive relation to the long-term maturity, which means that larger firms prefer longer
maturity and this preference is non-linear over the natural logarithm of net sales. While
there is no significant relation between Market Leverage and volatility of cash flows, we
find a positive coefficient for volatility in the maturity estimates. The firms with volatile
earnings might prefer to have less short-term debt because they are uncertain about being
able to repay it. Positive coefficients correspond to both, Investment Tax Credit and Net
Operating Loss Carry-forward, which means that the higher is the tax credit, the bigger
fraction of debt becomes long-term. Asset Maturity and Long-Term Debt percentage relate
positively. According to Myers (1977) firms try to match the maturities of their assets and
liabilities to decrease under-investment problems.
We assume that this empirical model calibrated at our sample predicts optimal leverage
and maturity structure. Under this assumption, deviations from predicted, target, values
of Market Leverage and percentage of Long-Term Debt take a form of deficit. The Market
Leverage deficit is positive when the firm is over-levered and negative when it does not issue
enough debt. The Long-Term Debt percentage deficit is positive when there proportion of
long-term debt over short-term debt is excessive and negative when this proportion is too
low.
In the context of this paper, the levels of “inefficiency” have more intricate explanatory
power than the levels of the corresponding variables.
4.4 Deviation from optimal Capital structure and Acquisi-
tion Activity
In this section we explore how leverage and maturity deficits affect M&A activity of a
company. We assign a dummy variable to every company who has made an acquisition in a
given year. An average over the entire sample gauges likelihood of becoming an acquirer. To
get an insight about the relation of acquisition activity and inefficiency of capital structure
policy, we split the sample along the Market Leverage Deficit and Long-Term Debt Deficit
variables and compute the probability of becoming an acquirer decile-by-decile. Figure 4.1
reports the results. Panel 4.1b shows an inverted U-shape curve for the probability of being
an acquirer along Market Leverage Deficit deciles, which is in line with the result by Uysal
(2011). Panel 4.1d shows a positive slope line along maturity deciles. The observation holds
through different types of acquisitions: the blue line presents all deals, the red line presents
asset acquisitions and the green line reports majority interest acquisitions.
4.4.1 Likelihood of being an Acquirer
We expect that over-levered firms will show lower M&A activity in comparison with their
under-levered counterparts and that companies with relatively long maturity will be more
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Table 4.2: Target Debt Structure Regressions. The table reports the time series means
of the coefficient estimates from the year-by-year (1991-2013) regressions of target leverage
ratio (second column) and long-term debt ratio (third column) over key financial measures
in the literature. The dependent variable is displayed in the corresponding column. All the
explanatory factors – except Market Leverage and Long-Term Debt – are one-year lagged.
t-statistics are reported in paretheses. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Market
Leverage Ratio
Long-Term
Debt Ratio
Market Leverage -0.033
(0.024)
Long-Term Debt Ratio 0.475∗∗∗
(0.025)
Market-to-Book -0.053∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗
(0.004) (0.028)
Market-to-Book∗Maturity -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
Tangibility 0.079∗∗∗
(0.008)
Profitability -0.174∗∗∗
(0.020)
Sales -0.020∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.019)
Sales Squarred 0.067∗∗∗
(0.021)
CF volatility 0.058 0.040∗
(0.091) (0.021)
Investment Tax Credit 0.032∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗
(0.010) (0.026)
Net opearting loss carryforward 0.046∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.060)
Abnormal Earnings 0.004 0.019
(0.007) (0.016)
Asset Maturity 0.117∗∗∗
(0.023)
Industry FE Yes Yes
R2 -0.076 0.129
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Figure 4.1: Probability of being an acquirer against market leverage and long-term debt
deficits. The panels (4.1a) and (4.1c) report the distributions of market leverage and long-term
debt deficits, respectively. The deficits are computed as deviations of an actual leverage and of an
actual long-term debt measure from the values forecasted by an empirical model. It is set by a pair
of simultaneous equations, estimated by the 3-stage OLS method. The panels (4.1b) and (4.1d)
show ratio of all, firm and asset acquirers against market leverage and long-term debt deficit deciles.
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frequent acquirers. Table 4.3 confirms this insight. It reports the coefficients of probit
regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy for a company undertaking an acqui-
sition in a given year. The negative coefficients corresponding to Market Leverage Deficit
and the positive coefficients before Long-Term Debt Percentage Deficit support our intu-
ition. The results also show that bigger, more profitable firms are more likely to become
an acquirer. The growth opportunities (Market-to-Book ratio) and Stock Return are also
positively associated with the probability of acquiring a company.
The regressions run on the subsample of Firm Acquisitions (Table 4.4) confirm the
results of the entire sample regressions. Firm Acquisitions coefficients are greater in mag-
nitude and seem to be the main drivers of the effect. The regressions run on the subsample
of Asset acquisitions (Table 4.5) exhibit lower, in absolute values, coefficients than both
the entire sample and Firm Acquisitions subsample. One can see as well that the growth
opportunities for asset acquisitions have a negative effect.
As a robustness check we also add square terms to prove the presence of the concave
curve and our hypothesis is confirmed. For the coefficients see Table 4.6. In the unreported
robustness checks we use specifications with and without control for cost of debt, measured
by the ratio of interest expenses to total debt. The results hold under both specifications.
4.4.2 Debt Overhang Theories. Investments and Acquisition Activity
Debt overhang theory suggested by Myers (1977) describes how conflicts between equity-
and debt-holders bring a company to inefficient investments. The companies with high
leverage do not invest as much as they would do if the debt holders did not own such a
considerate part of the company. We test three variants of the theory: by Myers (1977),
by Smith and Warner (1979), and by Diamond and He (2014). We regress the ratio of
investment activity both onto the deficit levels and with the predicted levels.
Myers (1977) suggests that a short-term debt might be a solution to the debt overhang
problem. Among two firms with the same leverage the one with less long-term debt will
have less severe underinvestment.
In our specification it would mean: first, the higher the leverage is the lower the bidder
ratio must be. It corresponds to a negative coefficients before Market Leverage Deficit and to
Theoretical Market Leverage in Table 4.7, column (7). Furthermore, more long-term debt is
supposed to result in lower bidder ratio. According to Myers (1977), taking more long-term
debt aggravates debt-overhang problem: its association with the likelihood of investments,
undertaking a takeover in our case, must be negative. We find no confirmation to this
effect in our sample. The positive coefficients before Long-term debt percentile deficit and
Theoretical Long-term debt percentile contradict the debt overhang theory. They suggest
that having more long-term debt increases the probability of investment, the probability of
becoming an acquirer.
This is why we investigate further and look at the alternative factors that could alleviate
the debt overhang problem. For this we turn to dynamic debt overhang theories by Smith
and Warner (1979) and Diamond and He (2014) which suggest that the timing of issuing
short-term debt can make underinvestment problem either more or less severe. Smith and
Warner, 1979, suggest that debt covenants can mitigate the underinvestment problem. The
covenants are supposed to protect debt-holders in case of the default. Cautious of that
equity-holders are going to invest more efficiently. We use Altman’s Z-score as a proxy
for likelihood of default. By construction, it is should alert of default proximity when the
score falls below 1.8 and indicate financial stability when it overgrows the threshold of 3.3.
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Table 4.3: Probability of being an Acquirer. All acquisitions. The table reports the
coefficients of probit regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy that equals one when
the company undertakes an acquisition in a given year. The Deficit and Fitted variables for
Market Leverage and Long-Term Debt Percentage are the results of the system of simulta-
neous equations. The negative coefficients corresponding to Market Leverage Deficit imply
that relatively over-levered firms are less likely to be acquirers. The positive coefficients
before Long-Term Debt Percentage Deficit mean that firms having longer maturity lever-
age are more likely to be acquirers. Industry fixed effects and Year fixed effects included.
t-statistics are reported in brackets. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ stand for 5%, 1% and 0.1% significance
levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Acquirer Acquirer Acquirer Acquirer
Acquirer
LT Debt Deficit 0.417∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗
(6.24) (6.96)
LT Debt Fitted 0.283∗∗∗
(3.57)
Mrkt Lev Deficit -0.441∗∗∗ -0.525∗∗∗ -0.160∗ -0.320∗∗∗
(-10.26) (-9.55) (-2.00) (-3.48)
Mrkt Lev Fitted -0.165∗ -0.603∗∗∗ -0.876∗∗∗
(-2.46) (-6.20) (-7.08)
Sales 0.172∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗
(31.39) (31.48) (31.88) (23.30)
Cost of Debt -0.0745∗ -0.0896∗ -0.0768∗ -0.0725∗
(-2.12) (-2.51) (-2.15) (-2.03)
Stock Return 0.0335∗ 0.0368∗ 0.0505∗∗ 0.0609∗∗∗
(2.11) (2.30) (3.14) (3.72)
Market-to-Book 0.0483∗∗∗ 0.0383∗∗∗ 0.0171 0.00597
(4.79) (3.52) (1.50) (0.50)
Profitability 1.202∗∗∗ 1.159∗∗∗ 1.072∗∗∗ 1.043∗∗∗
(10.67) (10.16) (9.34) (9.06)
Industry M&A Liquidity 0.275∗ 0.272∗ 0.258∗ 0.241∗
(2.37) (2.35) (2.23) (2.07)
HHI Sales -2.398 -2.333 -2.417 -2.588
(-0.32) (-0.31) (-0.32) (-0.34)
Observations 30677 30677 30677 30677
Pseudo R2 0.106 0.106 0.107 0.108
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.4: Probability of being an Acquirer. Firm acquisitions. The table reports
the coefficients of probit regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy that equals one
when the company undertakes an acquisition in the form of Majority Interest Acquisition
or a Merger in a given year. The Deficit and Fitted variables for Market Leverage and
Long-Term Debt Percentage are the results of the system of simultaneous equations. The
negative coefficients corresponding to Market Leverage Deficit imply that relatively over-
levered firms are less likely to be acquirers. The positive coefficients before Long-Term Debt
Percentage Deficit mean that firms having longer maturity leverage are more likely to be
acquirers. The regressions run on the subsample of Firm Acquisitions confirms the results of
entire sample regressions. Firm Acquisitions coefficients are greater in magnitude. Industry
fixed effects and Year fixed effects included. t-statistics are reported in brackets. ∗, ∗∗ and
∗∗∗ stand for 5%, 1% and 0.1% significance levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FAcquirer FAcquirer FAcquirer FAcquirer
FAcquirer
LT Debt Deficit 0.435∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗∗
(4.67) (5.19)
LT Debt Fitted 0.304∗∗
(2.81)
Mrkt Lev Deficit -0.481∗∗∗ -0.574∗∗∗ -0.194 -0.374∗∗
(-7.78) (-7.09) (-1.69) (-2.83)
Mrkt Lev Fitted -0.173 -0.630∗∗∗ -0.913∗∗∗
(-1.80) (-4.59) (-5.36)
Sales 0.151∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(20.56) (20.62) (20.91) (15.16)
Cost of Debt 0.00133 -0.0139 -0.000862 0.00324
(0.03) (-0.30) (-0.02) (0.07)
Stock Return 0.0547∗∗ 0.0581∗∗ 0.0726∗∗∗ 0.0839∗∗∗
(2.59) (2.73) (3.39) (3.86)
Market-to-Book 0.0895∗∗∗ 0.0803∗∗∗ 0.0595∗∗∗ 0.0484∗∗∗
(7.34) (6.07) (4.25) (3.32)
Profitability 0.481∗∗ 0.436∗∗ 0.344∗ 0.313∗
(3.23) (2.89) (2.27) (2.06)
Industry M&A Liquidity 0.520∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗
(3.64) (3.63) (3.51) (3.39)
HHI Sales -23.91∗ -23.82∗ -24.16∗ -24.54∗
(-2.29) (-2.28) (-2.31) (-2.35)
Observations 30677 30677 30677 30677
Pseudo R2 0.096 0.097 0.098 0.099
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.5: Probability of being an Acquirer. Asset acquisitions. The table reports
the coefficients of probit regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy that equals one
when the company undertakes an acquisition in a form of Asset acquisition in a given year.
The Deficit and Fitted variables for Market Leverage and Long-Term Debt Percentage are
the results of the system of simultaneous equations. The negative coefficients corresponding
to Market Leverage Deficit imply that relatively over-levered firms are less likely to be
acquirers. The positive coefficients before Long-Term Debt Percentage Deficit mean that
firms having longer maturity leverage are more likely to be acquirers. The regressions run
on the subsample of Asset acquisitions confirms the results of entire sample regressions.
Asset acquisitions exhibit lower in absolute values coefficients than both entire sample and
Firm Acquisitions subsample. Industry fixed effects and Year fixed effects included. t-
statistics are reported in brackets. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ stand for 5%, 1% and 0.1% significance
levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AAcquirer AAcquirer AAcquirer AAcquirer
AAcquirer
LT Debt Deficit 0.388∗∗∗ 0.453∗∗∗
(5.55) (6.22)
LT Debt Fitted 0.267∗∗
(3.22)
Mrkt Lev Deficit -0.376∗∗∗ -0.448∗∗∗ -0.110 -0.258∗∗
(-8.36) (-7.80) (-1.31) (-2.69)
Mrkt Lev Fitted -0.143∗ -0.551∗∗∗ -0.810∗∗∗
(-2.04) (-5.41) (-6.24)
Sales 0.164∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(28.80) (28.88) (29.23) (21.41)
Cost of Debt -0.0830∗ -0.0962∗ -0.0837∗ -0.0797∗
(-2.23) (-2.54) (-2.21) (-2.11)
Stock Return 0.0421∗ 0.0448∗∗ 0.0574∗∗∗ 0.0671∗∗∗
(2.53) (2.68) (3.41) (3.92)
Market-to-Book 0.0142 0.00544 -0.0143 -0.0250∗
(1.32) (0.47) (-1.18) (-1.98)
Profitability 1.249∗∗∗ 1.212∗∗∗ 1.131∗∗∗ 1.104∗∗∗
(10.33) (9.91) (9.19) (8.94)
Industry M&A Liquidity 0.0884 0.0862 0.0734 0.0570
(0.73) (0.71) (0.60) (0.47)
HHI Sales 3.679 3.741 3.702 3.526
(0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.45)
Observations 30677 30677 30677 30677
Pseudo R2 0.097 0.097 0.098 0.098
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 93
Table 4.6: Robustness Check. Probability of being an Acquirer. All acquisitions.
The table reports the coefficients of probit regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy
that equals one when the company undertakes an acquisition in a given year. The Deficit
and Fitted variables for Market Leverage and Long-Term Debt Percentage are the results
of the system of simultaneous equations. The negative coefficients corresponding to Market
Leverage Deficit imply that relatively over-levered firms are less likely to be acquirers.
The positive coefficients before Long-Term Debt Percentage Deficit mean that firms having
longer maturity leverage are more likely to be acquirers. Industry fixed effects and Year
fixed effects included. t-statistics are reported in brackets. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ stand for 5%, 1%
and 0.1% significance levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Acquirer Acquirer Acquirer Acquirer
Acquirer
Mrkt Lev Deficit -0.413∗∗∗ -0.477∗∗∗ -0.109 -0.268∗∗
(-9.64) (-8.64) (-1.37) (-2.93)
Mrkt Lev Deficit Sq. -0.546∗∗∗ -0.491∗∗∗ -0.524∗∗∗ -0.523∗∗∗
(-3.79) (-3.34) (-3.56) (-3.55)
Mrkt Lev Fitted -0.121 -0.563∗∗∗ -0.828∗∗∗
(-1.84) (-5.90) (-6.85)
LT Debt Deficit 0.419∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗
(6.41) (7.12)
LT Debt Fitted 0.276∗∗∗
(3.57)
Sales 0.172∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗
(31.93) (31.94) (32.32) (23.69)
Stock Return 0.0307∗ 0.0331∗ 0.0474∗∗ 0.0578∗∗∗
(1.97) (2.12) (3.01) (3.61)
Market-to-Book 0.0446∗∗∗ 0.0371∗∗∗ 0.0162 0.00558
(4.65) (3.57) (1.49) (0.49)
Profitability 1.168∗∗∗ 1.140∗∗∗ 1.050∗∗∗ 1.021∗∗∗
(10.78) (10.42) (9.54) (9.24)
Industry M&A Liquidity 0.269∗ 0.268∗ 0.253∗ 0.236∗
(2.40) (2.39) (2.25) (2.10)
HHI Sales -0.375 -0.368 -0.600 -0.761
(-0.05) (-0.05) (-0.08) (-0.10)
Observations 31916 31916 31916 31916
Pseudo R2 0.106 0.106 0.107 0.107
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.7: Debt Overhang Theories. The table presents the test of three Debt Overhang
Theories. Columns from (1) to (6) cover Diamond and He (2014) hypothesis that depending
on the timing of investment opportunities, short-term debt can generate a higher debt
overhang problem. The variables Boom (as defined by the BEA), CF over Total Assets
and Market-to-Book ratio characterise how favorable the time period is for an investment.
Column (7) tests classical Myers (1977) hypothesis. Columns (8) and (9) report the test of
Smith, Warner(1979) and verify whether covenants can alleviate the problem. The proxy for
this effect is an interproduct of leverage and maturity measures and Altman’s Z-score. Both
negative coefficients corresponding to Market Leverage Deficit and to Theoretical Market
Leverage reveal the debt overhang problem. The positive coefficients before Long-Term Debt
Deficit and Long-Term Debt Percentile, predicted contradict the debt overhang theory. They
suggest that having more long-term debt increases the probability of becoming an acquirer.
Industry fixed effects and Year fixed effects included. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ stand for 5%, 1% and
0.1% significance levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Diamond He Diamond He Diamond He Diamond He Diamond He Diamond He Myers Myers Smith Warner Smith Warner
Acquirer
LT Debt Deficit 0.486∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗
(5.77) (4.58) (6.08) (5.21) (5.34) (5.54) (6.32) (6.32) (6.22) (5.88)
LT Debt Fitted 0.257∗∗ 0.257∗∗ 0.221∗∗ 0.211∗∗ 0.261∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗ 0.261∗∗ 0.215∗∗ 0.227∗∗
(3.18) (3.17) (2.72) (2.58) (3.23) (3.54) (3.23) (3.23) (2.63) (2.74)
Mrkt Lev Deficit -0.236∗ -0.318∗ -0.151 -0.208∗ -0.247∗∗ 0.0870 -0.246∗∗ -0.246∗∗ -0.183 -0.135
(-2.51) (-2.41) (-1.60) (-2.14) (-2.64) (0.53) (-2.64) (-2.64) (-1.90) (-1.23)
Mrkt Lev Fitted -0.804∗∗∗ -0.805∗∗∗ -0.643∗∗∗ -0.592∗∗∗ -0.798∗∗∗ -0.879∗∗∗ -0.797∗∗∗ -0.797∗∗∗ -0.706∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗
(-6.36) (-6.36) (-5.00) (-4.56) (-6.32) (-6.73) (-6.32) (-6.32) (-5.47) (-5.52)
LT Debt Deficit*Boom -0.0485 0.0220
(-0.87) (0.23)
Booming Economy -0.0519 -0.0508
(-0.78) (-0.76)
Mrkt Lev Deficit*Boom 0.140
(0.88)
LT Debt Deficit* CF/Tot.As. -0.472 0.733
(-1.60) (1.43)
CF/Tot.As. 0.942∗∗∗ 0.939∗∗∗
(6.79) (6.75)
Mrkt Lev Deficit* CF/Tot.As. 2.605∗∗
(2.86)
LT Debt Deficit*MtB ratio 0.00427 -0.0973∗
(0.19) (-2.07)
Mark.Lev. Deficit*MtB ratio -0.212∗
(-2.48)
LT Debt Deficit*Z-score -0.00847 -0.0203
(-1.23) (-1.39)
Altman’s z-score 0.0135∗∗∗ 0.0125∗∗
(3.35) (2.98)
Mark.Lev. Deficit*Z-score -0.0250
(-0.92)
Sales Lagged 0.158∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗
(22.48) (22.48) (22.23) (22.25) (22.47) (22.23) (22.47) (22.47) (22.85) (22.78)
Stock Return 0.0643∗∗∗ 0.0647∗∗∗ 0.0519∗∗ 0.0501∗∗ 0.0638∗∗∗ 0.0619∗∗∗ 0.0640∗∗∗ 0.0640∗∗∗ 0.0687∗∗∗ 0.0681∗∗∗
(3.84) (3.86) (3.07) (2.96) (3.81) (3.69) (3.82) (3.82) (4.06) (4.02)
Market-to-Book -0.0254∗ -0.0253∗ -0.0180 -0.0176 -0.0252∗ -0.0275∗ -0.0252∗ -0.0252∗ -0.0508∗∗∗ -0.0496∗∗∗
(-2.11) (-2.10) (-1.48) (-1.45) (-2.09) (-2.28) (-2.10) (-2.10) (-3.68) (-3.58)
Profitability 1.095∗∗∗ 1.095∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗ 0.480∗∗ 1.098∗∗∗ 1.097∗∗∗ 1.097∗∗∗ 1.097∗∗∗ 1.063∗∗∗ 1.060∗∗∗
(9.23) (9.24) (2.86) (3.10) (9.26) (9.25) (9.25) (9.25) (8.64) (8.62)
Industry M&A Liquidity 0.0796 0.0795 0.0829 0.0838 0.0803 0.0823 0.0804 0.0804 0.0874 0.0889
(0.67) (0.67) (0.70) (0.71) (0.68) (0.70) (0.68) (0.68) (0.74) (0.75)
HHI Sales 7.165 7.139 6.859 6.913 7.131 7.087 7.137 7.137 7.328 7.338
(0.94) (0.94) (0.90) (0.90) (0.93) (0.93) (0.93) (0.93) (0.95) (0.96)
Observations 31916 31916 31916 31916 31916 31916 31916 31916 31489 31489
Pseudo R2 0.098 0.099 0.100 0.100 0.098 0.099 0.098 0.098 0.100 0.101
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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For the test of the hypothesis that covenants can alleviate debt overhang problem, we use
an interprodcut of maturity deficit and Z-score. Columns (8) and (9) in Table 4.7 report
the results of the test. While having a one point higher Z-score is likely to increase the
probability of becoming an acquirer, there is no significant interaction between the score
and the maturity characteristics.
The third theory by Diamond and He (2014) predicts that inappropriate timing of short-
term debt issuing can aggravate the debt overhang. We use three proxies for timing: Boom
time, as it is described by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Cash Flows over Total Assets
and Market-to-Book ratio. Boom is the time between the bottom of the business cycle and
its peak. The ratio of Cash Flows over Total Assets gauges profitability of the firm. As
we discussed above, Market-to-Book ratio is a proxy for growth opportunities of a firm, it
measures how much the market values firm’s assets in comparison with their book value.
All three variables stand for the time at which an immediate investment together with
short-term debt can decrease debt overhang. However, in “bad” times, when return on
investments is low, short-term debt, in contrast, increases the problem. In this context, we
expect to find negative coefficients for interproducts of long-term maturity measures and
favourable for investment time proxies. In columns (1) to (6) of the Table 4.7 there are no
significant coefficients either to support the theory. We see though that Cash Flow over
Total Assets ratio is positively associated with the likelihood of undertaking acquisition. It
is interesting to note that, given Cash Flow over Total Assets, Market Leverage covaries
with the dependent variable and, given Market-to-Book ratio, it has a negative relation.
Thus positive association between long-term maturity measures and probability of be-
ing an acquirer provides support for neither static, nor dynamic debt overhang theories.
However, we find that the deviation of leverage from target level has a bigger effect on
the likelihood of becoming an acquirer the more profitable the firm is and the less growth
opportunities it has.
4.5 Debt Maturity and Value Creation
The previous sections covered how pre-acquisition deviation from target maturity structure
associated with likelihood of becoming an acquirer. To complete the analysis, we examine
the implications of debt maturity policy for characteristics of takeover deals and for bidder
and target returns.
4.5.1 Average Size of Target Firm
First, we look at an average size of a target, which we define as a ratio of the total dollar
volume of all acquisitions made by the firm during a year to the number of these acquisitions.
Table 4.8 demonstrates that the average target size is increasing in maturity deficit and
decreasing in its level. The more short-term debt oriented the firm is, the higher is going
to be the average dollar value of its target However, if a firm deviates downwards from its
target maturity policy, i.e., if it takes more short-term debt than it should according to
its optimal maturity, the lower its acquisitions target size will become. Thus, bidders with
optimally short maturity who “non-optimally” increased their maturity are more likely to
acquirer the biggest targets. Leverage deficit has a negative association with the average
target size. Sales and Profitability have a negative association as well. Market-to-Book and
Stock Return relate positively. So the optimistic evaluation at the market increases the
potential size of a target while sales and earnings decrease it.
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Table 4.8: Average Size of a Target. All acquisitions. The table reports the coefficients
of regressions for an average size of a target. We define it as a ratio of the total dollar volume
of all acquisitions made by the firm during a year to the number of these acquisitions. The
average target size is increasing in maturity deficit and decreasing in its level. The more
short-term debt oriented the firm is, the higher is going to be the average dollar value of
its target However, if a firm deviates downwards from its target maturity policy, i.e., if it
takes more short-term debt than it should according to its optimal maturity, the lower its
acquisitions target size will become. Thus, bidders with optimally short maturity who “non-
optimally” increased their maturity are more likely to acquirer the biggest targets. Leverage
deficit has a negative association with the average target size. Sales and Profitability have
a negative association as well. Market-to-Book and Stock Return relate positively. So the
optimistic evaluation at the market increases the potential size of a target while sales and
earnings decrease it.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Target Size
LT Debt Deficit 0.191∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗
(5.09) (5.12) (5.07) (5.09)
LT Debt Fitted -0.383∗∗ -0.366∗
(-2.61) (-2.47)
Mrkt Lev Deficit -0.258∗∗ -0.275∗∗ -0.247∗∗ -0.258∗∗
(-2.93) (-3.07) (-2.79) (-2.87)
Mrkt Lev Fitted -0.226 -0.140
(-1.09) (-0.67)
Sales -0.0303∗∗∗ -0.0283∗∗∗ -0.0117 -0.0112
(-3.96) (-3.60) (-1.12) (-1.07)
Stock Return 0.0957∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.0939∗∗∗ 0.0989∗∗∗
(3.79) (3.94) (3.72) (3.75)
Market-to-Book 0.0611∗∗∗ 0.0505∗∗ 0.0588∗∗∗ 0.0523∗∗
(4.33) (2.95) (4.17) (3.05)
Profitability -0.684∗∗∗ -0.730∗∗∗ -0.714∗∗∗ -0.741∗∗∗
(-3.71) (-3.86) (-3.86) (-3.91)
Industry M&A Liquidity 0.261 0.252 0.271 0.265
(1.38) (1.33) (1.43) (1.40)
HHI Sales -11.82 -12.02 -12.02 -12.13
(-1.53) (-1.56) (-1.56) (-1.57)
Observations 13034 13034 13034 13034
Pseudo R2 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086
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4.5.2 Abnormal Returns
To study how the market reacts to acquisition announcements we compute Cumulative
Abnormal Returns (CARs). We compute them on the basis of Fama-French three-factor
model. Table 4.9 reports descriptive statistics for bidders CARs split over leverage and
maturity policies. The top panel reports the number of observations belonging to a respec-
tive intersect of leverage and maturity quartiles. One can see that firms tend to cluster
at the diagonal. In other words, if a firm is in the second bottom quartile with respect to
the leverage deficit, it is most likely in the corresponding, second bottom, quartile along
maturity deficit. Overall, we report 13,612 bidders.
The second panel summarizes mean CARs. They are positive everywhere besides second
quartile along leverage deficit and forth quartile with respect to maturity. There, it is 0.1. In
the next panel we see that standard deviation tends to be higher in top quartiles with respect
to either measures. The minimum and the maximum (reported in two bottom panels) are
the same throughout all quartiles. The later effect appears because of winsorisation at the
1% and 99%.
To study Acquisition Premium or Target CAR, we construct a sample of 647 deals, for
which we know firm characteristics for both bidder and target. We found no significant evi-
dence about Acquisition Premium or Target CAR. Table 4.10 indicates that over-leveraged
firms and firms with higher leverage maturity pay higher premiums relative to other firms
but no effect is significant.
Table 4.11 reports coefficient estimates of acquirer returns which are calculated over
a three-day event window (one day before and one day after the announcement date).
The benchmark returns are the value-weighted index of returns including dividends for the
combined New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange and NASDAQ. The table
indicates that CAR increases with leverage deficit. However, no significant or consistent
association found.
We have tested alternative approaches: total gains and dollar gains instead of CARs, —
and specifications: changing time window for CARs and applying Capital Gains Tax as an
instrumental variable — none of them revealed any effect.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper examines the relation between deviations from target debt maturity and acqui-
sition decisions. Since target levels of capital structure and debt maturity are unobservable,
we use a two-stage estimation procedure to find the effects of deviations from target leverage
and maturity of debt. In the first stage, we use the simultaneous-equation system proposed
by Johnson (2003) to jointly determine leverage and debt maturity targets of firms. In the
second stage, we perform a probit regression of the probability of becoming an acquirer on
the leverage and debt maturity deficits obtained from the first stage, and other controls.
We perform our analysis on a large sample of mergers and acquisitions for public U.S.
companies using data from Compustat and SDC Platinum for the period 1991 to 2013.
We confirm the association between leverage deficit and M&A activity found in the
previous research and find a positive relation between the percentage of long-term debt
and the likelihood of being an acquirer. This result is robust to the type of acquisition:
it shows on the entire sample as well as on firm or asset acquisitions subsamples. The
negative association between leverage deficit and probability of investment encourages us
to test Myers (1977) debt overhang theory. However, neither original static, nor dynamic
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Table 4.9: Descriptive Statistics for Bidder CARs. The table reports the summary
statistics for acquirers’ Cumulative Abnormal Returns. The statistics is presented on the
grid of Market Leverage Deficit and Long-term debt percentile deficit quartiles.
Number of observations
Long-Term Debt Deficite, quartile
Mkt.Lev.Def., quart. 1 2 3 4 Total
1 1,329.0 899.0 891.0 284.0 3,403.0
2 1,008.0 1,117.0 922.0 356.0 3,403.0
3 733.0 1,076.0 1,093.0 501.0 3,403.0
4 333.0 311.0 497.0 2,262.0 3,403.0
Total 3,403.0 3,403.0 3,403.0 3,403.0 13,612.0
Mean
Long-Term Debt Deficite, quartile
Mkt.Lev.Def., quart. 1 2 3 4 Total
1 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.4 0.5
2 0.7 0.4 0.4 -0.1 0.4
3 0.5 0.0 0.7 1.1 0.5
4 0.5 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.5
Total 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5
S.d.
Long-Term Debt Deficite, quartile
Mkt.Lev.Def., quart. 1 2 3 4 Total
1 5.1 4.8 4.9 6.2 5.1
2 5.1 4.3 4.5 5.7 4.8
3 5.1 4.1 5.0 5.8 4.9
4 5.4 6.0 5.6 5.1 5.3
Total 5.1 4.6 5.0 5.4 5.0
Minimum
Long-Term Debt Deficite, quartile
Mkt.Lev.Def., quart. 1 2 3 4 Total
1 -14.5 -14.5 -14.5 -14.5 -14.5
2 -14.5 -14.5 -14.5 -14.5 -14.5
3 -14.5 -14.5 -14.5 -14.5 -14.5
4 -14.5 -14.5 -14.5 -14.5 -14.5
Total -14.5 -14.5 -14.5 -14.5 -14.5
Maximum
Long-Term Debt Deficite, quartile
Mkt.Lev.Def., quart. 1 2 3 4 Total
1 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9
2 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9
3 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9
4 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9
Total 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9
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Table 4.10: Regressions for Acquisition Premium and Target CAR. The table
reports regression estimates for Acquisition Premium and Target CAR(-42,1). The table
indicates that over-levered firms pay higher premiums relative to other firms. However,
no significant association found. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. Industry fixed
effects and Year fixed effects included.
Acq Prm Acq Prm Target CAR(-42,1) Target CAR(-42,1)
LT Debt Deficit 596.0 4.765
(1.46) (0.25)
LT Debt Fitted 191.2 -40.46
(0.42) (-1.86)
Mrkt Lev Deficit 797.2 1233.8 3.655 43.64
(1.73) (1.75) (0.17) (1.30)
Mrkt Lev Fitted 667.0 55.52 23.56 48.32
(1.43) (0.08) (1.07) (1.51)
Sales 32.89 27.18 2.118 3.603∗
(0.96) (0.71) (1.30) (1.99)
Market-to-Book 13.52 -15.49 3.553 3.671
(0.23) (-0.25) (1.28) (1.26)
Profitability 49.13 -6.276 3.727 8.674
(0.06) (-0.01) (0.10) (0.23)
Stock Return 88.99 101.5 1.471 0.514
(0.90) (1.02) (0.31) (0.11)
Within Industry Acquisition 56.11 51.42 -0.590 0.241
(0.50) (0.46) (-0.11) (0.05)
All Cash -460.7∗∗∗ -469.6∗∗∗ 15.88∗∗ 15.93∗∗
(-3.94) (-4.02) (2.87) (2.88)
Competed 84.35 93.11 11.23 8.959
(0.32) (0.35) (0.90) (0.72)
Hostile -37.84 -32.54 -18.57 -18.10
(-0.10) (-0.09) (-1.05) (-1.02)
Industry M&A Liquidity 512.7 500.3 -33.29 -28.81
(0.90) (0.87) (-1.23) (-1.06)
Sales HHI 16127.8 19385.1 164.1 186.0
(0.66) (0.79) (0.14) (0.16)
Target M-t-B -15.03 -16.24 -7.248∗∗ -6.868∗∗
(-0.32) (-0.34) (-3.25) (-3.07)
Target Profitability -422.1 -402.6 -24.00 -23.72
(-1.45) (-1.38) (-1.74) (-1.72)
Target Stock Return -22.87 -20.27 -5.009 -4.980
(-0.29) (-0.25) (-1.32) (-1.32)
Observations 647 647 648 648
R2 0.043 0.047 0.058 0.064
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.11: Regression of Bidder CARs. The table reports coefficient estimates of
acquirer returns which are calculated over a three-day event window (one day before and
one day after the announcement date). The benchmark returns are the value-weighted index
of returns including dividends for the combined New York Stock Exchange, American Stock
Exchange and NASDAQ. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. The table indicates that
CAR increases with leverage deficit. However, no significant association found. Industry
fixed effects and Year fixed effects included. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ stand for 5%, 1% and 0.1%
significance levels, respectively.
All Acquisitions
CAR(-2;1)
Firm Acquisitions
CAR(-2;1)
Assets Acquisitions
CAR(-2;1)
LT Debt Deficit -0.765 0.361 -1.595∗
(-1.17) (0.31) (-1.99)
LT Debt Fitted -0.944 0.0631 -1.817
(-1.25) (0.05) (-1.96)
Mrkt Lev Deficit 1.260 4.146∗ 0.0785
(1.44) (2.34) (0.08)
Mrkt Lev Fitted 3.115∗ 3.771 3.422∗
(2.57) (1.79) (2.27)
Sales Lagged -0.270∗∗∗ -0.324∗∗ -0.256∗∗
(-4.05) (-2.80) (-3.11)
Market-to-Book -0.175 -0.0254 -0.290∗
(-1.74) (-0.16) (-2.17)
Profitability 2.105 4.932∗ 0.716
(1.79) (2.44) (0.49)
Stock Return 0.0850 0.158 0.0122
(0.56) (0.62) (0.06)
Relative Size 0.622∗∗ 0.255 1.340∗∗∗
(2.83) (0.83) (3.82)
Public Target -1.679∗∗∗ -2.132∗∗∗ 3.764
(-6.72) (-4.57) (1.20)
Private Target -0.517∗∗ -0.602 -0.660∗∗
(-2.81) (-1.28) (-3.25)
Within Industry Acquisition -0.0725 0.119 -0.151
(-0.43) (0.39) (-0.74)
All Cash 0.259 1.256∗∗∗ -0.218
(1.53) (3.95) (-1.09)
Competed 0.305 0.140 3.361
(0.35) (0.15) (0.62)
Hostile -0.0770 -0.0305 0
(-0.05) (-0.02) (.)
Industry M&A Liquidity 0.0491 -2.146 1.922
(0.04) (-1.03) (1.29)
HHI Sales -38.12 -269.9∗∗ 83.63
(-0.73) (-2.77) (1.34)
Observations 4994 1799 3195
R2 0.053 0.106 0.057
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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variants (Diamond and He (2014)) find support in our study. Neither does debt overhang
theory with covenants by Smith and Warner (1979). We show an interesting pattern of how
average target firm size depend on different aspects of bidder’s maturity policy. The size
increases in maturity deficit and decreases in optimal maturity ratio. Yet, no significant
value creation effects are found.
The potential research effort can be directed to further search of value creation effects,
studying debt structure (for example, bank versus public debt, secured versus unsecured
debt), and to the development of an appropriate model as an alternative to the debt over-
hang theory.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
My thesis studies the roles of capital structure and debt maturity in the interaction between
individual companies and industries.
Chapters 2 reveals the role of leverage in the interaction between non-financial industries.
The simple theoretical model and the empirical study show that, first, the more suppliers
or customers an industry has, the higher its leverage becomes and, second, that industries
with highly levered partners have a higher leverage themselves.
Chapter 3 studies the relations between the leverage ratios of non-financial companies.
This empirical work supports the hypothesis that individual firms use their leverage as a
commitment tool in a firm-specific relationship.
Chapter4 focuses on the relation between capital structure policies and mergers and
acquisitions activity. My co-authors and I find that the probability of becoming an acquirer
is positively associated with the firms pre-acquisition deviation from target debt maturity.
The surprising contrast between the results of Chapters 2 and 3 — the positive relation
between the centrality of an industry and its average leverage ratio and the negative asso-
ciation between the centrality of an individual firm and its leverage — creates a promising
potential for future research. A subsequent research would present a game theory model
describing the mechanism of how economic agents can use leverage either as a commitment
tool for firm-specific relationship, or as a tool to improve their bargaining power within
an upstream-downstream negotiation depending on the parameters of the economy. The
insight is that some agents’ characteristics make them vulnerable and put them into an
inflexible position in a production economy. For instance, a firm acting in a highly competi-
tive industry can easily lose a customer or a supplier. Such an agent will search for the ways
to encourage their trading counter-agents to enter and maintain a relation. While an agent
feeling an opportunity for conducting negotiation — for example, because of the uniqueness
of its product — will bargain over the total surplus using debt as a threat of default. Thus,
applying a game theory framework I will show that depending on the characteristics of indi-
vidual nodes, their clusters, and entire networks, such as market concentration, uniqueness
of product, and sector regulation the strategic role of leverage can vary.
There is a potential to use a novel Factset dataset on firms’ competitors to analyse intra-
industry strategic use of leverage. I expect to find that the less reputed, poorer, and younger
companies tend to copy their more successful and mature counterparts, as it is predicted by
information-based theories and theories of capital structure in product market. The reason
for this behavior being either an attempt to pretend to be a more profitable and mature
company than it is in fact or a lack of resources to conduct a necessary research. I expect
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also to find similarities in the dynamics of capital structure within the same industry due to
similar production shocks, regulation, as well as shocks to equity prices. The research could
cover a comparative analysis of the traditional ways of identifying inter-firm relations, by
industry codes, with self-identified connections reported in a form 10-K according to the
reporting requirements, and Hoberg and Phillips (2016) textual analysis identification. In
another of my future studies I would like to take a deeper look at the capital structure puz-
zle spreading my focus to cash holdings and trade credit. Similar to the principles which
drive company’s leverage and, thus, its financial flexibility, cash holdings, trade credit, and,
moreover, the interaction of all three will provide a more sound ground to my findings.
Currently, I use these parameters as controls but their use could be extended to an integral
study. The Factset database also allows me to explore the dynamics of these policies along
different stages of vertical integration. This provides an opportunity to take into account
the intensity of inter-firm connections.
Another aspect of interaction between economic agents is spillover mechanisms. Cor-
porate financing behavior must partly explain securities’ returns and thus, the dynamics of
liquidity in the market. I believe that combining a strategic component (debt and equity
issuing from a corporate finance policies perspective) and a technical component (frictions
in stock and bond markets) promises a good outcome for applied research. This can have an
impact on stock and bond trading dynamics and formation of joint portfolio. Understand-
ing the spillover mechanism will also reveal how shocks propagate through the inter-agent
connections.
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